

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

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MAR 15 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of
Tennessee Valley Authority

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Docket Nos. 50-327
50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE 89-18,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Reference: TVA letter to NRC dated December 8, 1989, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
(SQN) - Technical Specification (TS) Change 89-18"

This letter provides a revision to TVA Calculation SQN-SQS2-0097 and provides the Westinghouse Electric Corporation's report documenting the qualitative evaluation of the SQN design for the residual heat removal (RHR) system autoclosure interlock deletion.

Enclosure 1 of this letter contains Revision 2 of TVA Calculation SQN-SQS2-0097. Revision 1 was provided as an attachment to Enclosure 2 in the referenced letter. The calculation revision was discussed with Harry Balukjian and Jack Donohew of your staff on February 5, 1990.

During a review of the calculation, TVA identified language that could lead to an incorrect interpretation. The reference made to RHR suction valves not opening against full reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure was made as a partial explanation of why premature opening of the valves was not addressed in the Westinghouse Owner's Group analysis. This reference was to Salem Nuclear Plant; SQN's present design does not duplicate Salem. TVA has increased the RHR suction valves' motor sizes and disconnected the torque switches. SQN's valves, therefore, may be capable of opening against full RCS pressure. However, SQN's design contains an open permissive interlock to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent opening. Additionally, the electrical power to these valves is procedurally locked out as an extra preventative measure. Thus, the conclusions of the calculation remain unchanged.

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
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Enclosure 2 contains the Westinghouse report that documents a comparative evaluation between Salem and SQN with regard to the deletion of the autoclosure interlock. Based on SQN's proposed alarm configuration, estimated failure probabilities for interfacing system loss of coolant accident potential, RHR system availability, and low-temperature overpressurization were determined. In each case, the failure probability for SQN with the autoclosure interlock removed and the main control room alarm installed is less than the failure probability with the autoclosure interlock remaining. The results and conclusions for Salem in Westinghouse WCAP-11736-A, "Residual Heat Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Report for the Westinghouse Owners Group," are not invalidated by the proposed design for SQN.

No commitments are contained in this submittal. Please direct questions concerning this issue to Kathy S. Whitaker at (615) 843-7748.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



E. G. Wallace, Manager
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Enclosures

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ENCLOSURE 1

REVISION 2 OF TVA CALCULATION

SQN-SQS2-0097

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