

New Hampshire Yankee

Ted C. Feigenbaum
Senior Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer

NYN- 90063

March 12, 1990

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

References: Facility Operating License No. NPF-67, Docket No. 50-443


Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-008-000: Initiation of Plant
Shutdown due to Loss of Both Containment Enclosure Emergency Air
Cleanup Systems

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-008-00 for
Seabrook Station. This submittal documents an event which was identified on
February 9, 1990, and is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Should you require further information regarding this matter, please
contact Mr. Richard R. Belanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.

Sincerely yours,



Ted C. Feigenbaum

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

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March 12, 1990
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cc: Mr. William T. Russell
Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. Victor Nerses, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-3
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Atlanta, GA 30339

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1) Seabrook Station										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 OF 0 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Initiation of Plant Shutdown due to Loss of Both Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0 2	0 9	9 0	0 9	0 0	8	0 0	0 3	1 2					0 5 0 0 0								
OPERATING MODE (9) 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)						
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)			20.405(e)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)									
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(e)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)									
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(e)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)												
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)												
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER									
NAME Richard R. Belanger, Lead Engineer - Compliance - Extension 4048												AREA CODE 6 0 3				TELEPHONE NUMBER 4 7 4 - 9 5 2 1					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO									
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)																					
<p>On February 9, 1990, at 8:47 am EST, the latching mechanism for a door entering the Containment Enclosure Building failed, rendering the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System incapable of producing the negative pressure required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1b.2d.4. Therefore, both trains of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System were determined to be inoperable and a plant cooldown was initiated at 9:00 am.</p> <p>The latching mechanism for the door was repaired and the door was returned to service at 9:25 am, restoring compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.1.</p> <p>The root cause of the noncompliance with Technical Specifications is the failure of the door latching mechanism. This door opens into the Enclosure Building from the Main Steam and Feedwater West Pipe Chase, therefore the differential pressure between these areas creates an opening force on the door. This force, combined with normal wear, resulted in the failure of the latching mechanism.</p> <p>There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The inoperability of the Containment Enclosure Air Cleanup Systems did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel.</p>																					

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Seabrook Station	0500044390	—	008	—	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use addition of NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On February 9, 1990, at 8:47 am EST, the latching mechanism for a door entering the Containment Enclosure Building failed, rendering the door incapable of being maintained closed. With this door inoperable, the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System was not capable of producing a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch water gauge within the containment enclosure annulus as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.1b.2d.4. Therefore, both trains of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System were determined to be inoperable. Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 requires that two Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3 and 4. The ACTION associated with this specification does not address the condition of both systems being inoperable, therefore, a plant cooldown in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.3 was initiated at 9:00 am.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The latching mechanism for the door was repaired and the door was returned to service at 9:26 am, restoring compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.1. The plant cooldown was terminated at this time. Revisions to Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 to provide an ACTION requirement addressing the inoperability of two Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems due to the lack of enclosure building integrity are being evaluated.

ROOT CAUSE

The root cause of the noncompliance with Technical Specifications is the failure of the door latching mechanism. This door opens into the Enclosure Building from the Main Steam and Feedwater West Pipe Chase, therefore the differential pressure between these areas creates an opening force on the door. This force, combined with normal wear, resulted in the failure of the latching mechanism.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems function to ensure that, during LOCA conditions, leakage into the annulus is filtered through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers prior to release to ensure that site boundary radiation doses remain within the limits of 10 CFR 100. At the time of this event, the unit had been shutdown since June 22, 1989, following a total of 19.2 effective full power minutes of operation. Therefore, the inoperability of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup Systems did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel.

This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.

At the time of this event, Seabrook Station was in MODE 4 with the Reactor Coolant System [AB] at 333 degrees Fahrenheit and pressurized to 925 psig.