

with T_{avg} above 250°F and a maximum heatup of 40°F in any one hour period with T_{avg} less than or equal to 250°F .

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

- A maximum heatup of ~~100~~⁷⁰ $^{\circ}\text{F}$ in any one hour period.
- A maximum cooldown of 100°F in any one hour period with T_{avg} above 250°F and a maximum cooldown of 20°F in any one hour period with T_{avg} below 250°F .
- A maximum temperature change of 5°F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and ~~500~~³⁰⁰ psia, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.1.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.1.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4-5. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figure 3.4-2.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

- a. A maximum heatup of 100°F in any one hour period,
- b. A maximum cooldown of 200°F in any one hour period, and
- c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of 400°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than ~~500~~ ³⁰⁰ psig within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

see attached
pages

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of ≤ 450 psig, or
- b. A reactor coolant system vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: When the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is $\leq 275^{\circ}\text{F}$.

ACTION:

- a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.
- b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met:

- a. One of the following three overpressure protection systems shall be in place:
 1. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting ≤ 422.7 psia or
 2. A single PORV with a lift setting of ≤ 422.7 psia and a reactor coolant system vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches, or
 3. A reactor coolant system (RCS) vent ≥ 2.6 square inches.
- b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps # shall be disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.
- c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOV)s[#] shall be prevented from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS.
- d. No more than one high pressure safety injection pump with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to inject flow into the RCS and when used, it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply:
 1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be limited to ≤ 350 gpm OR
 2. A reactor coolant system vent of ≥ 2.6 square inches shall exist.

APPLICABILITY: When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is $\leq 319^{\circ}\text{F}$ and an RCS vent ≤ 8 square inches exists.

ACTION:

- a. With one PORV inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV to **OPERABLE** status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 1.3 square inch vent(s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.
- b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a ≥ 2.6 square inch vent(s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one **OPERABLE** PORV and a vent of ≥ 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to **OPERABLE** status.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

- c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. With less than two HPSI pumps[#] disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours.
- e. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs[#] not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, either shut and disable the affected MOV within four hours or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within the next four hours, and implement the action requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable.
- f. With HPSI flow exceeding 350 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists,
 - 1. immediately take action to reduce flow to less than 350 gpm.
 - 2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature of Figure 3.4-2b.
 - 3. If the pressure limit was exceeded, taken action in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.1.
- g. The provisions of specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

[#] EXCEPT when required for manual use or testing in accordance with approved procedures.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE.
- b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.
- c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.
- d. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements for ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or by verifying their discharge valves are locked shut. The automatic opening feature of the high pressure safety injection loop MOVs shall be verified disabled at least once per 12 hours.

*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

Y vent pathways

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1. Reactor Coolant Loop #11 (#21) and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
2. Reactor Coolant Loop #12 (#22) and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump,
3. Shutdown Cooling Loop #11 (#21)*,
4. Shutdown Cooling Loop #12 (#22)*.

b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation**.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4***# and 5***#.

ACTION:

- a. With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loops to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours.
- b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation within one hour.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.3.1 The required shutdown cooling loop(s), if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability for pumps and shutdown cooling loop valves.

level
indicated water

*The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

**All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

***A reactor coolant pump shall not be started ³¹⁹with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 275°F unless (1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 200 cubic feet or (2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 16°F (34°F when measured by a 1SD °F surface contact instrument) above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

#See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

3.4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.195 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above the low level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant shutdown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time.

In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting ³¹⁹ a Reactor Coolant Pump during MODES 4 and 5 with one or more RCS cold legs ²⁷⁵ ~~< 275~~ °F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into ~~34~~ (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 46 °F ~~(34 °F when measured by a surface contact instrument)~~ above the ~~coolant temperature in the reactor vessel.~~

Reactor Coolant System temperature.

3.4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

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The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve approximately 3×10^5 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating shutdown cooling loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS over-pressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2750 psia. The combined relief capacity of these valves is sufficient to

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A flow path from the boric acid storage tank via either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in specification 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or
- b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump* to the Reactor Coolant system if only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1 when a flow path from the concentrated boric acid tanks is used.
- b. At least once per 31 days be verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

* When $T_{avg} \leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$, the OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump will be placed in Pull-to-Lock and will not start automatically. Manual use of the high pressure safety injection pump will be conducted in accordance with approved

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procedures under the restrictions of Specification 3.4.9.3.d.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump* in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

* When $T_{avg} \leq 350^{\circ}F$, the OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump will be placed in Pull-to-Lock and will not start automatically. Manual use of the high pressure safety injection pump will be conducted in accordance with approved procedures under the restrictions of Specification 3.4.9.3.d.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - $T_{avg} < 300^{\circ}\text{F}$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One[#] OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and
- b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

~~4.5.3.2 All high-pressure safety injection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is $\leq 275^{\circ}\text{F}$ by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.~~

*With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.

[#]A maximum of one high-pressure safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is $\leq 275^{\circ}\text{F}$.

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see also new footnote
proposed by license amendment
request dated February 14, 1990

Amendment 319
10.34

~~Amendment 10.16~~

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

<u>Valve Number</u>	<u>Valve Function</u>	<u>Valve Position</u>
1. MOV-659	1. Mini-flow Isolation	1. Open
2. MOV-660	2. Mini-flow Isolation	2. Open
3. CV-306	3. Low Pressure SI Flow Control	3. Open

- b. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open.
2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

- d. Within 4 hours prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying, via local indication at the valve, that CV-306 is open.

* Whenever flow testing into the RCS is required, the high pressure safety injection pump shall recirculate RCS water (suction from (RWT isolated) or the controls of LCO 3.4.9.3 shall apply if the RCS cold leg temperature is $\leq 319^{\circ}\text{F}$.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to ≥ 7.0 . The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.

(insert attached paragraph) for temperatures above 319 °F

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)

The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

At temperatures below 319°F, HPSI flow is limited to less than or equal to 350 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. This provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shows this flow rate is more than adequate to meet safety analysis assumptions. HPSI's are not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition. The Safety Injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI.

Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 350 gpm or an adequate vent must be provided