

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)  
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT / / (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/8/0/8/8/1/ (8) / / / / / / (9)  
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On August 8, 1981, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the "B" Reactor Trip Breaker/  
 /0/3/ / failed to open when a high pressurizer pressure signal was simulated. The "A" /  
 /0/4/ / reactor trip breaker was available in the event of an automatic reactor trip; /  
 /0/5/ / therefore the health and safety of the general public were not affected. This is/  
 /0/6/ / reportable pursuant to T.S. 3.3.1.1 and 6.9.1.9.b. /  
 /0/7/ / /  
 /0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE  
 CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /I/A/ (11) /E/ (12) /B/ (13) /C/K/T/B/R/K/ (14) /A/ (15) /Z/ (16)  
 LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION  
 (17) REPORT NO. NO.  
 NUMBER /8/ / - / /0/6/3/ / \ / /0/3/ /X/ /- / /1/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT  
 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER  
 /A/ (18) /Z/ (19) /E/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /W/1/2/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / A metal latch in the undervoltage trip attachment failed which prevented the trip/  
 /1/1/ / signal from opening the "B" Reactor Trip Breaker. The manual reactor trip /  
 /1/2/ / switches in the control room and locally were not affected. The undervoltage /  
 /1/3/ / trip attachment was replaced and the reactor trip breaker retested. /  
 /1/4/ / /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
 /1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /D/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
 /1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES  
 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
 /1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES  
 NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
 /1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  
 TYPE DESCRIPTION  
 /1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / NRC USE ONLY / / / / / / / / / / / / /

8109290310 810916 PDR AD0CK 05000338 S PDR F PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Updated Report - Previous Report Date 08-24-81

Virginia Electric and Power Company  
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1  
Docket No. 50-338  
Report No. LER 81-063/03X-1

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

#### Description of Event

On August 8, 1981, with Unit 1 at 100% power, the "B" Main Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open when a high pressurizer pressure signal was simulated.

#### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The failure of the undervoltage trip attachment would prevent the "B" Main Reactor Trip Breaker from opening for any automatic reactor trip signal. The manual reactor trip switches were not affected by the failure of the undervoltage trip device. The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker was available in the event of any automatic reactor trip; therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

#### Cause of Event

A metal latch in the undervoltage trip attachment failed. This device is a solenoid that is de-energized by an automatic reactor trip signal. The solenoid plunger normally impacts a trip bar inside the reactor trip breaker switchgear. The failed latch prevented the plunger linkage from contacting the trip bar in the "B" Main Reactor Trip Breaker.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

The unit began a rampdown in order to be in hot standby within the 6 hour Action Statement of T.S. 3.3.1.1. The undervoltage trip attachment was replaced and the trip breaker was retested satisfactorily. The rampdown was stopped at approximately 92% power and the Action Statement was cleared within two hours of the failure discovery.

#### Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is required.

#### Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

#### Generic Implications

This is the only failure of this type that has been experienced at North Anna. The vendor is investigating the mode of failure.