

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 10, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRC-50-259/81045

The enclosed report provides details concerning unit 1 which was in a cold shutdown while units 2 and 3 were in the run mode with start bus undervoltage relays out of service for the 1A and 1B start buses. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 1 Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure (3)

cc (Enclosure):

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Office of Management Information and Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Director (40)
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Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
Palo Alto, California 94303

Mr. R. F. Sullivan, NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRD-50- 259 / 81045 Technical Specification involved 3.9.B.10

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2) *Date due NRC: 9/18/81

Date of Occurrence 8/19/81 Time of Occurrence 1045 Unit 1 and 2

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

On August 15, 1981, unit 1 was in cold shutdown and unit 2 and unit 3 were in the run mode with start bus undervoltage relays out of service for the 1A and 1B start buses. (Reference T.S. 3.9.B.10)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in cold shutdown.

Unit 2 at 76%.

Unit 3 at 98%.

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

Upon discovery of error, immediately met the requirements of T.S. 3.9.B.10.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Personnel error. During preliminary review of modification workplan which contained the removal from service of the 1A start bus undervoltage relays, it was not recognized that technical specification 3.9.B.10 did not permit this activity. Instead, the workplan was approved so that this modification and related modification to degraded voltage relays could be worked and tested together. The existing technical specification allowed the degraded voltage modification, but not the start bus undervoltage modification. Proposed technical specifications would have allowed the start bus work, but were not approved. Also this was not identified in the USQD.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity, no damage to the plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.

Corrective Action:

1A start bus undervoltage relays were reconnected immediately upon discovery of the error. This is considered a random event and no further recurrence control is required.

Failure Data:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: 