

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 1 5

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 27 CAT 58

CONT

01 L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 8 1 5 8 1 6 0 9 1 4 8 1 5

REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 With the unit at full power, during the performance of Periodic Test 25.1,

013 MOV-SW-202A (service water to the flash evaporator, vacuum priming and condensate

014 polishing building) failed to close due to a grounded motor. This is contrary to

015 T.S. -3.4.A.5 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Since manual isolation of the flow

016 path remained available and the intake canal level was more than 7 feet greater than

017 the minimum required level of 18 feet, the health and safety of the public were not

018 affected.

09 S B 11 E 12 A 13 V A L V E X 14 B 15 D 16

SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 COMP. SUBCODE 15 VALVE SUBCODE 16

17 8 1 0 5 2 0 3 L 0

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 REPORT TYPE 30 REVISION NO. 32

A 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 A 25 P 3 4 0 26

ACTION TAKEN 33 FUTURE ACTION 34 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 HOURS 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 41 NPD-4 FORM SUB. 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 The grounding of MOV-SW-202A's motor was due to flooding in its sump. The pump motor

111 was replaced and the valve cycled to verify operability.

112

113

114

115 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A B 31 Performing Periodic Test 32

FACILITY STATUS 8 9 % POWER 10 11 OTHER STATUS 12 13 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 44 45 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 46

116 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A 36

ACTIVITY CONTENT 10 11 RELEASED OF RELEASE 12 13 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

117 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 10 11 TYPE 12 13 DESCRIPTION 39

118 0 0 0 40 N/A 41

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 10 11 DESCRIPTION 41

119 Z 42 N/A 43

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 10 11 DESCRIPTION 43

120 N 44 8109220463 810914 PDR ADOCK 05000281 S PDR

PUBLICATION 10 11 ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-052/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 08-15-81

MOV-SW-202A FAILED TO CLOSE

1. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

With the unit at full power, during the performance of Periodic Test T.S.1, MOV-SW-202A (Service Water to the Flash Evaporator, Vacuum Priming and the Condensate Polishing Building) failed to close due to a grounded motor. Since the valve would not have closed automatically if required, this is contrary to T.S.3.4.A.5 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

Following a DBA, water in the intake canal would be used to cool the re-circulation spray heat exchangers. The service water valves to vacuum priming, condensate polishing and flash evaporator are designed to close automatically on a CLS Hi-Hi signal in coincidence with a station blackout to conserve water in the intake canal for the recirculation spray heat exchangers. During the time of valve inoperability, the intake canal level was more than 7 feet greater than the minimum required level of 18 feet. In addition, manual isolation of the flow path remained available. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The motor operator for MOV-SW-202A was grounded due to flooding in the sump. Water from an equipment leak in the turbine building had collected in the valve pit, and was found to be in contact with the motor operator.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The sump was drained, the motor operator was replaced and the valve cycled to verify operability. The valve responded properly.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The sump level alarm system will be reviewed to eliminate spurious and nuisance alarms, allowing plant personnel to respond more effectively to accumulation of water in the valve pits.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.