


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 14, 1981



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT - OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

The subject open item was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
R. W. Wright on October 24, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR's SQN EEB 8023 through SQN EEB 8042 (excluding SQN EEB 8034), SQN EEB
8045R1, SQN EEB 8051, SQN MEB 8007R1, and SQN NEB 8031 through SQN NEB
8034. Information concerning these items was submitted on November 25,
1980, and January 23, February 18, March 25, April 14, April 28, June 19,
and August 21, 1981. Enclosed is further information concerning item
SQN EEB 8036R2. We expect to submit our next report by July 25, 1982.
This matter was discussed with Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on September 14, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. M. Mills".

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
OPEN ITEM 50-328/81-20-04

In the response to SQN EEB 8036R2, TVA indicated that flow switches FS-30-200 and FS-30-207 were not qualified for the postulated accident environment and would be relocated to a more suitable environment before initial criticality. Alternately, new switches were procured and installed; however, post modification testing showed the switches to have an unacceptably slow operation time.

TVA has evaluated the function of these switches to determine the safety implications of their inoperability. The switches are installed on the Emergency Gas Treatment System room coolers. The switches were designed to automatically start the standby cooler upon low flow to the operating cooler. Operating practices, however, require both fans be lined up in automatic in which case the flow switch function is bypassed. On an auxiliary building isolation (ABI) or when the room temperature reaches a predetermined setpoint, both fans will automatically start and run until the ABI is reset and/or the temperature is reduced. TVA concludes this is an acceptable mode of operation and that the failure of the subject flow switches will not prevent these cooling fans from performing their intended functions.