LER

Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS817128

August 25, 1981

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.2 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on July 28, 1981. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-81-21
Report Date: August 25, 1981
Occurrence Date: July 28, 1981
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station
Brownville, Nebraska 68321

Identification of Occurrence:
A condition occurred which resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation established in Section 3.5.F.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
The reactor was at 96% of rated thermal power.

Description of Occurrence:
During performance of Surveillance Procedure 6.3.12.1 to prove operability of #2 Diesel Generator (DG) because #1 DG was inoperable (reference LER's 81-19 and 81-20), an injector line failed. The DG was shut down and declared inoperable.

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Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The failure of the injector line is evaluated to be the result of the combined effects of metal fatigue and vibration. The failure is considered an isolated event.



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Analysis of Occurrence:

The station's emergency power system consists of two emergency diesel generators, each capable of supplying power for post accident safety system operation and safe reactor cool down.

The injector line connects the individual cylinder injector pumps to their respective injectors. The line is heavy-wall ½" tubing (wall thickness = 3/16"). The line failed near the injector compression fitting due to what is evaluated to be the combined effects of metal fatigue and vibration. Failure of this line would not have made the DG inoperable under accident conditions. The engine would have carried full load on the other cylinders; however, it was shut down during the test due to equipment safety considerations. At the time this DG was shutdown, the other DG's fuel supply hose had been repaired (reference LER 81-19). The other DG had not yet been tested after maintenance, but would have functioned after clearing the equipment tagout in effect.

The normal, startup, and emergency transformers were operable during this event. This occurrence presented no adverse consequences to the public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

The injector line was immediately replaced. The DG was tested satisfactorily and returned to service. Although this is the first failure of this type at this site on either DG, components have been ordered to replace all injector lines on both diesels if such action is considered necessary. Once these components are on site, replacement and inspection of lines will be accomplished during an appropriate diesel outage.

Sincerely,

L. C. Lessor
Station Superintendent
Cooper Nuclear Station

LCL:cg
Attach.