

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32							
REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR					SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.					REFERENCE CODE		REPLY TYPE		NO.							
	8	1				0	3	6			0	3	L		0							
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER							
A	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	Y	24	N	25	X	9	9	9	26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7 8 9
FACILITY STATUS (28) % POWER (29) OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5 E 1 0 0 NA A Operator Observation

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	NA

1 9 Z (42) NA 8109150397 810903
PDR ADOCK 05000318 NRC USE ONLY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) S NA PDR
2 0 N (44) 88 69 8
G. S. Pavis/P. G. Rizzo (301) 269-4742/4786

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LER NO. 81-36/3L
DOCKET NO. 50-318
LICENSE NO. DPR-69
EVENT DATE 08-04-81
REPORT DATE 09-03-81
ATTACHMENT

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

Fuseholder assembly F-2 (Bussman type HMB), a part of the Reactor Protective System Calibration and Instrument Panel (RPSCIP) assembly, was found to have its internal fuse cartridge contact separated from its feed-through conductor. This created an intermittent open or high resistance condition in the 120 VAC supply to the panel. Direct current power supplies in the panel supply power to the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure and Axial Power Distribution Calculators which are located elsewhere in Channel B, RPS Cabinet. Therefore, intermittent 120 VAC at the RPSCIP caused spurious power-related trips to occur.

The last known operation of the fuseholder assembly was during the Unit's last refueling outage when vendor personnel performed a cabinet modification using an approved facility change procedure. It is surmised that the repetitive removal and insertion of fuses necessary to accomplish the installation and testing of new circuits resulted in at least one occasion of overtightening the cap of the fuseholder. The bayonet-style locking cap, itself, was not damaged.

On 8-4-81, the symptom of receiving intermittent power-related trips was short-lived. When maintenance personnel arrived, no indications of a problem were evident.

On 8-7-81, at 0305 hours, the symptom recurred. Maintenance personnel were called. While troubleshooting they withdrew the RPSCIP assembly and noted immediate receipt of power-related trips and loss of power to a panel meter. F-2 fuseholder cap was then noted to be loose (not firmly engaged with the assembly body). The cap was tightened. No further trips were received. Similarly installed fuseholder caps on all other channels of RPS were checked for tightness. All were secure.

Again, on 8-11-81, intermittent trips occurred. F-2 fuseholder assembly was found broken during further troubleshooting. As no spare assembly was in stock, a Facility Change Request was prepared and approved to install a similarly rated fuseholder assembly which was on hand. Upon receipt of an exact replacement on 8-17-81, final repair was effected.

During the troubleshooting which took place on 8-11-81, technicians found the Nuclear Power Calibrate Potentiometer to be intermittently contacting. This unrelated failure could have caused the Nuclear Power signal to fluctuate, exacerbating the problem of intermittent trips. The potentiometer (Bourns #35005-2-502) was immediately replaced with a like spare.

Because this event is a first occurrence, and the probable nature of its cause - high usage during unusual circumstances by personnel other than licensee's employees - no preventive action is deemed necessary.