

# DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE AREA 704  
373-4083

September 4, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/81-11. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

*William O. Parker, Jr.*  
William O. Parker, Jr. *By WOB*

JFK/php  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management & Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalley  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
P. O. Box 10412  
Palo Alto, California 94303

Mr. F. Jape  
Resident Inspector-NRC  
Oconee Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2

REPORT NUMBER: RO-270/81-11

REPORT DATE: September 4, 1981

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 6, 1981

FACILITY: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor inoperable due to Operator Aid Computer being out of service.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Oconee 2, 100% FP

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: On August 6, 1981, at 1409, and then again on August 7, 1981, at 2330, the Oconee Unit 2 Operator Aid Computer was out of service. This was due to erratic readings of points in the analog system the first time and erratic printing on the alarm typer the second time. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.1.12.1(d) since both RCS Subcooling Margin Monitors were inoperable without a backup method for determining subcooling margin for temperatures outside the  $T_H$  narrow range indication (520°F to 620°F).

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: A bad AGRA2 group relay board and matrix card apparently caused the first computer malfunction. An apparent cause was not determined for the second computer malfunction which was cleared after shutting down and restarting the computer.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: Technical Specification 3.1.12.1(d) states that if both subcooling monitors are inoperable, then restore one monitor to operable status within 48 hours. In both cases the computer was restored to an operable status well within the time permitted. These incidents did not affect the operating status of Oconee Unit 2. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The first computer malfunction was corrected by replacement of two AGRA2 group relay boards and one matrix card. The second computer malfunction was cleared by performing a restart of the computer. A procedural change has been made to provide the operator with backup method for determining subcooling margin using a voltmeter to determine wide range  $T_H$ .