

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
 /0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT
 SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/8/1/0/8/1/ (8) /0/9/0/2/8/1/ (9)
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE
 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On August 10, 1981, during Mode 3 operation, an inadvertent actuation of Train B /
 /0/3/ / of the Emergency Core Cooling System occurred. This actuation caused the borated /
 /0/4/ / water concentration in the Boron Injection Tank to drop below the minimum re- /
 /0/5/ / quired by T.S. 3.5.4.1. Since this was an inadvertent actuation, the health and /
 /0/6/ / safety of the public were not affected. This event is reportable pursuant to /
 /0/7/ / T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. and the special reporting requirement of T.S. 3.5.2. /
 /0/8/ /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COM- SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/ /S/F/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/A/ (13)	/C/K/T/B/K/R/ (14)	/E/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)	/8/1/	/-/	/0/6/2/	/ \ /	/0/3/
	/L/	/-/	/0/		

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/H/ (18)	/A/ (19)	/C/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/N/ (25)	/W/1/2/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / This event was caused by a defective "Low Pressurizer Pressure SI" Reset and /
 /1/1/ / Block switch. When the switch was released from the "Block" position, it spring /
 /1/2/ / returned past the center to the "Reset" position reinstating the Low Pressurizer /
 /1/3/ / Pressure SI function. The detective switch will be replaced when unit conditions /
 /1/4/ / permit. /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /G/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ N/A / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / /

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Description of Event

On August 10, 1981, at 1851 while in Mode 3, the ECCS Train B actuated when the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI Block/Reset switch spring returned past the center (neutral) position to the "Reset" position. This caused an inadvertent reinstating of the "Lo Pzr Press" SI function. Since system pressure at that time was below the activation setpoint of 1765 psig, (actual pressure was 1494 psig), the ECCS actuated.

The actions of 2-EP-5 were completed and the signal was reset at 1854 when it was determined to be an inadvertent actuation.

As a result of the Safety Injection, the contents of the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) were flushed to the Reactor Coolant System which caused the boron concentration in the BIT to fall below the minimum Technical Specification limit of 20,000 ppm of borated water. The BIT did perform it's intended function.

All of the Train B SI equipment operated as required. This was the third actuation of ECCS reportable as per T.S. 6.9.2. The usage factor for the affected SI injection nozzles has not exceeded 0.70.

The ECCS actuation is reportable as per T.S. 3.5.2 which requires a Special Report in accordance with T.S. 6.9.2 within 90 days. This Licensee Event Report is intended to satisfy the T.S. 6.9.2 requirements.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The purpose of the Emergency Core Cooling System is to ensure adequate cooling of the reactor in the event of a loss of coolant accident. Although the safety injection system performed its intended function to inject borated water into the Reactor Coolant System, an actual accident condition did not exist and therefore the SI was not required. As a result, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The "Lo Pzr Press" Block switch has three positions; Block, Reset and Center. Both the Block and Reset positions spring return to the center position. When the switch was moved to the "Block" position and released, it returned past the center to the "Reset" position on the Train B switch which unblocked the Train B Low Pressure SI function. Since system pressure was below the Lo Pzr Pressure SI setpoint of 1765 psig the ECCS inadvertently actuated.

Immediate Corrective Action

The unit was stabilized and the equipment returned to normal. Using an approved procedure, the defect in the switch was demonstrated several times confirming the cause of the event. This was done without actually injecting water into the RCS. All Control Room Operators were made aware of the defect in the switch.

Scheduled Corrective Action

When a replacement switch can be obtained and when unit conditions allow, the switches will be replaced.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

All control room operators have been made aware of the defect in the switch and have been instructed not to release the switch from the unblocked position but to return it to center prior to releasing the switch.

No further actions are necessary at this time. The SI blocked status lights provide positive indication of when the SI function is blocked or when it is reset.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.