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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

July 31, 1981


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/81-14. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2). which concerns operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. F. Jape
Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P.O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303



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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report Number: RO-269/81-14

Report Date: July 31, 1981

Occurrence Date: July 17, 1981

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: A & B High Pressure Service Water Pumps Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 - cold S/D
Oconee 2 - 100% FP
Oconee 3 - 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: At 0300 hours on July 17, 1981, it was discovered that the A & B High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) pumps had no control power indication and that the Elevated Water Storage Tank (EWST) showed 0 level. This prevented both automatic and manual start of the pumps should they be needed to maintain EWST level. This constitutes operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The problem with the control power for the A & B HPSW pumps was due to the Control Breaker Source A & B breakers located in cabinets B₁T₁ and B₂T₁₃ being open. These breakers were left open when an isolation on the Unit 1 Startup Transformer CT₁ was done at approximately 1106 on July 14, 1981. The problem with the EWST level indication was a blown fuse.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the time period that the A & B HPSW pumps were inoperable, the HPSW jockey pump maintained EWST level at greater than 90,000 gallons and HPSW pressure at approximately 125 pounds. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The immediate action of locating the open Control Power Source Breakers and reclosing them and the successful completion of the HPSW pump and power performance test corrected the loss of the HPSW pumps. The blown fuse was replaced, thus returning the EWST to service. To prevent additional losses of HPSW:

- 1) A change has been made to the shift turnover sheets to have a minimum of 2 HPSW pumps operable verified every shift.
- 2) A procedure is being written to cover removing from or returning to service 6900/4160/600 V breakers.
- 3) On shift training to instruct personnel on how to properly remove breakers from service and on the consequences of de-energizing unknown equipment.