


LEA

OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

JCP&L GPU

Jersey Central Power & Light
Company is a Member of the
General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-6000 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

September 1, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406




Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-40/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-40/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(1) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


J. T. Carroll, Jr.
Acting Director Oyster Creek

JTC:dh
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J.

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-40/3L

Report Date

September 1, 1981

Occurrence Date

August 15, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

Electromatic Relief Valve High Pressure Sensors IA83B and IA83C were found to exceed the limiting safety system actuation setpoint, Technical Specification 2.3.4.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown.

Description of Occurrence

On Saturday, August 15, 1981, during performance of the Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration (Plant Procedure 602.3.004) pressure switches IA83B and IA83C were found to trip at a setting less conservative than the Technical Specification limit of <1070 psig. Surveillance test data was as follows:

<u>Sensor</u>	<u>*Tech. Spec. Limit (psig)</u>	<u>*As Found Trip (psig)</u>
IA83A	1079.15	1055
IA83B	1084.5	1104 + 19.5
IA83C	1076.8	1083 + 6.2
IA83D	1082.2	1069
IA83E	1082.2	1082

*Include head corrections

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to instrument repeatability.

Analysis of Occurrence

Primary system relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during the most severe transients that include a scram. An analysis of turbine trip from full power with a failure of bypass to function has shown with a relief valve setpoint of 1125 psig the EMRV's are capable of limiting the peak pressure below the setpoint of the first group of safety valves and well below the fuel design pressure limits and reactor coolant system pressure safety limit.

The relief valve Technical Specification limit of 1070 psig (not including head correction) was chosen to maintain an adequate margin between peak pressure and the setpoint of the first group of safety valves. Since the relief valves were still functional and tripped only slightly higher than the desired setpoint the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The sensors were reset to trip within Technical Specification limits. A Technical Specification change was previously submitted to raise the setpoint of the Electromatic Relief Valves. In addition, these sensors are scheduled to be replaced during the next refueling outage with an improved design.

Failure Data

Barksdale Pressure Switch
Model #B2SH12SS
Range 0-3000 psig