

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

August 31, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re. McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-128. This report concerns T.S. 4.3.1.1, "Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel and interlock shall be demonstrated operable by the performance of the channel check, channel calibration and channel functional test operations for the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1." This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *by [signature]*

PBN/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector-NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

REPORT NUMBER: 81-128

REPORT DATE: August 31, 1981

OCCURRENCE DATE: August 14, 1981, and August 16, 1981

FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, NC

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: The channel functional tests of the reactor trip instrumentation were not performed prior to start-up, as required by Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Mode 2, Startup

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: The Unit #1 reactor was started up (escalated from mode 3 to mode 2) on August 14, 1981 and again on August 16, 1981 without performing the Manual Reactor Trip, Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux, or the Source Range, Neutron Flux Channel functional tests as required by Technical Specification 4.3.1.1. During Zero Power Physics Testing on August 14, 1981, some leaks developed on the Pressurizer level instrument tubing. After the repairs were completed, the reactor was brought up to criticality. The procedure used in the startup was the Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup. Although this procedure includes all of the necessary checklists to cover the required surveillance items, the operators on duty started the procedure in the section that was consistent with Reactor Coolant System operating conditions at that time. In bypassing the first part of the procedure, they missed several surveillance items that were required by Technical Specifications.

On August 16, 1981, the reactor was restarted following a trip that was part of the Zero Power Physics Test Program. This time the Reactor Trip Recovery procedure was used for the startup. The Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure did not include the channel functional tests of the reactor trip instrumentation as prerequisites, and thus the required channel functional tests were missed on both startups.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The channel functional tests of the reactor trip instrumentation are required to be performed before every startup unless they have been done within the previous seven days. The Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux Channel Check was the only test that met the surveillance requirement for either of the startups. Operators using the controlling Procedure for Unit Startup were required to verify as complete all prerequisites before entering the procedure at an advanced point. The operators involved in the startup on August 14, 1981 failed to do an adequate verification of the prerequisite sections of the procedure. The Reactor Trip Recovery procedure used for the startup on August 16, 1981 was deficient in its prerequisites.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: All of the reactor trip instrumentation functional channel checks were performed satisfactorily on August 17, 1981. Since the instrumentation was in good working order at that time and hence throughout the time since the previous tests, the safe operation of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operations will begin every startup that uses the Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup at the beginning of the procedure. Every checklist and prerequisite will be verified individually. The Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure has been modified to include the missing surveillance items.