



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 168 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

August 28, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier  
Director of USNRC  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406



Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-81/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-81/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
Manager -  
Salem Generating Station

CC: R. A. Uderitz  
General Manager - Nuclear Production  
Director, Office of Inspection  
and Enforcement (30 copies)  
Director, Office of Management  
Information and Program Control  
(3 copies)

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Report Number: 81-81/03L  
Report Date: 8-28-81  
Occurrence Date: 8-14-81  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

2A Diesel Generator Start Time Failures.  
This report is initiated by Incident Report 81-329.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 91% - Unit Load 1000 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the performance of surveillance procedure SP(0)4.8.1.1.2, on August 14, 1981, 2A diesel generator failed to meet the starting time requirements,  $\leq 10$  seconds, of technical specification 3.8.1.1. The starting time was 12 seconds. At 0505 hours, August 14, 1981, 2A diesel generator was declared inoperable and action statement 3.8.1.1.a was entered and the provisions of the action statement were complied with.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with technical specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment failure. The reason the 2A diesel failed to meet the starting time requirement was the turbo boost air reservoir was down in pressure from the normal 250 psi to approximately 75 psi. The compressor was running continuously, but not charging the reservoir due to the fact the compressor hydraulic unloader valve was sticking.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical specification 3.8.1.1.a requires:

With either an offsite circuit or diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining A.C. sources by performing surveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The compressor hydraulic unloader valve was repaired. The compressor was tested satisfactorily and returned to service. Surveillance procedure SP(O)4.8.1.1.2 was satisfactorily performed on 2A diesel within the required starting time. At 0742, August 14, 1981, action statement 3.8.1.1.a was terminated.

FAILURE DATA:

Quincy Compressor Division  
Hydraulic Unloader Valve  
PN: 7970X

Prepared By F. Dickey

SORC Meeting No. 81-83

H. J. Vafidura  
Manager - Salem Generating Station