

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: 1										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
T N S N P 2 7 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5										L I C E N S E E C O D E L I C E N S E N U M B E R L I C E N S E T Y P E C A T									
R E P O R T S O U R C E L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8 7 0 8 0 3 8 1 8 0 8 2 8 8 1 9										D O C K E T N U M B E R E V E N T D A T E R E P O R T D A T E									
E V E N T D E S C R I P T I O N A N D P R O B A B L E C O N S E Q U E N C E S 10																			
At 0648 on 8/3/81 with Unit 2 in mode 5, (95°F and 0 PSIG, prior to initial																			
criticality) and a post-modification test in progress on the train A reactor																			
protection system, the unit operator observed that both train A and train B																			
source range detectors were disabled. This condition placed Unit 2 in action																			
statement 5 of LCO 3.3.1.1. There was no effect on public health or safety. No																			
previous occurrences.																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> SYSTEM CODE T A 11 L E R / R O R E P O R T N U M B E R 8 1 17 </div> <div> CAUSE CODE D 12 A C T I O N F U T U R E T A K E N G 18 19 </div> <div> CAUSE SUBCODE Z 13 E F F E C T O N P L A N T Z 20 </div> <div> COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 S H U T D O W N M E T H O D Z 21 </div> <div> COMP. SUBCODE E 15 O C C U R R E N C E C O D E 0 3 22 </div> <div> VALVE SUBCODE Z 16 R E P O R T T Y P E L 23 </div> <div> REVISION NO. 0 32 C O M P O N E N T M A N U F A C T U R E R W 1 2 0 </div> </div>																			
C A U S E D E S C R I P T I O N A N D C O R R E C T I V E A C T I O N S 27																			
During post-modification testing on train A reactor protection system, instrumentation																			
personnel placed the train B input error inhibit switch in "inhibit". With both																			
trains' input error inhibit switches in "inhibit", source range detector voltage																			
is disabled. The input error inhibit switch was immediately returned to normal																			
and a caution was added to appropriate plant instructions.																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> FACILITY STATUS D 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 </div> <div> OTHER STATUS NA 36 </div> <div> METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 </div> <div> DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator observation 45 </div> </div>																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 </div> <div> AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 41 </div> <div> LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 42 </div> </div>																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 17 18 19 20 21 22 </div> <div> TYPE Z 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION NA 46 </div> </div>																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 41 42 43 44 45 </div> <div> DESCRIPTION NA 46 </div> </div>																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 47 48 </div></div>																			

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-328/81091 Technical Specification Involved: 3.3.1.1

Reported Under Technical Specification : 6.9.1.13.b

Date of Occurrence: 08/03/81 Time Of Occurrence: 0640 CDT

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The unit operator observed that both source range detectors were disabled.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit in Mode 5 (95° F and 0 PSIG) prior to initial criticality and post-modification testing of SSPS train A in progress.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

By placing the input error inhibit switches for both trains in "inhibit", the voltage to both source range detectors was disabled.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Since the output mode selector switches for both trains were in "test" maintenance personnel were unaware that placing both input error in "inhibit" would have an effect on the source range detectors.

Corrective Action:

The operator immediately notified the instrument mechanic who returned the input error inhibit switch for train B to "normal". The source range detectors were therefore immediately returned to service. A procedure change has been initiated to add a caution to appropriate plant instructions to alert maintenance personnel that this condition will occur.