

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
 /0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT
 SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/8/0/7/8/1/ (8) /0/8/2/6/8/1/ (9)
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On August 7, 1981, while operating in Mode 1, the post accident hydrogen recomb-
 /0/3/ / ner 2-HC-HC-1 would not heat up during the performance of the periodic surveil-
 /0/4/ / lance test. Since a separate independent containment hydrogen recombiner re-
 /0/5/ / mained available while the inoperable recombiner was repaired, the public health
 /0/6/ / and safety were not affected.
 /0/7/ /
 /0/8/ /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/ /S/E/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/E/ (13)	/X/X/X/X/X/X/ (14)	/X/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17) REPORT NUMBER	/8/1/	/-/	/0/6/1/	/ \ /	/0/3/
	/L/	/-/	/0/		

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/A/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/R/3/4/4/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The cause of this event was due to a defective Reaction Chamber Gas Temperature
 /1/1/ / controller and a damaged thermocouple cable. The controller was replaced, the
 /1/2/ / cable repaired and the test repeated satisfactorily.
 /1/3/ /
 /1/4/ /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/B/ (31)	/During Surveillance Testing/

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / /

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 81-061/03L-0

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Description of Event

On August 7, 1981, with Unit 1 at 100% power, the post accident hydrogen recombiner (2-HC-HC-1) would not heat to its required operating temperature while conducting a periodic surveillance test for that equipment. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.6.4.2 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since a separate redundant containment post-accident hydrogen recombiner (shared with Unit 2) remained available for use; and since the out of service hydrogen recombiner was placed back in service within the allowable action requirements of Technical Specifications, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

This event was caused by a defective reaction gas chamber temperature controller and a damaged thermocouple cable. No reason for the defective controller can be determined. The thermocouple cable was possibly damaged during recent construction in the area around the hydrogen recombiners.

Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action included declaring the hydrogen recombiners 2-HC-HC-1 inoperable and issuing a work request. Subsequent to the above action, the thermocouple cable was repaired and the reaction gas temperature controller was replaced and calibrated. The periodic surveillance test was then repeated satisfactorily.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective action was required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions were required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit #1
Docket No. 50-338
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Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

On August 4, 1981, with Unit 1 at 25% power, the steam generator 1C Feedwater Flow Channel III Indication began spuriously spiking high.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The Channel III Feedwater Flow for steam generator 1C was indicating a flow rate similar to the redundant channel except when it occasionally spiked high. The duration of the spurious high output was extremely short compared with the time that the channel's output was normal. Although the channel would still have been able to provide its input to the reactor protection circuitry it was placed in a tripped condition within one hour. The trip signal provided a conservative logic matrix for a reactor trip and a safety injection; therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The multiplier/divider/square root card for the steam generator 1C Feedwater Flow Channel III failed.

Immediate Corrective Action

The channel was immediately placed in test and the failed instrument card was replaced. The loop was calibrated and returned to service.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is scheduled.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.