



PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET

P.O. BOX 8699

PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

(215) 841-4000

August 26, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406



Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. R. Blough, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on August 12, 1981.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report No.:	LER 2-81-38/1T-0
Report Date:	August 26, 1981
Occurrence Date:	August 12, 1981
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.(9) requires prompt reporting of "Performance of structures, systems, or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specifications bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition."

IF22
5/1/1

8109030219 810826
PDR ADDCK 05000277
S PDR

Description of the Event:

During a safe shutdown analysis, with respect to fire protection, cable designation and routing errors were discovered on the Unit 2 4kv emergency bus breaker control cable schemes. The cable designation errors caused separation deficiencies on various control switches and relays.

Probable Consequences of the Occurrence:

A fire of the severity and nature assumed in the safe shutdown analysis could cause loss of breaker control, opening of closed breakers, and loss of emergency bus low voltage automatic diesel start capability and associated automatic breaker closure. Measures have been taken to assure that if a fire which could affect these cables were to occur, the 4kv emergency buses will be supplied by the emergency diesel generators, and Unit 2 will be shutdown, if necessary.

Cause of the Event:

During the design phase of Peach Bottom Unit 2, 4kv feeder breaker control cable was improperly designated as non-safeguard, resulting in the improper routing of cabling and separation deficiencies in various control switches and relays.

Immediate Corrective Actions:

The cable trays and conduits in which the Unit 2 cables are routed have been physically identified. A continuous roving firewatch has been established to monitor these cables and trays. If a fire which could affect these conduits and trays were to occur, the emergency diesel generators will be manually started, and closed into their respective buses. The startup feed breakers will be opened and the solid links from the breaker close solenoid fuse blocks will be removed. If necessary, shutdown will proceed so that Unit 2 is in cold shutdown within 24 hours. Additionally, the use of ignition sources in the areas of concern has been limited.

Future Corrective Actions


An engineering design review is in progress to correct the designation and routing problems. It is expected that the review will result in redesign and rerouting of cables as safeguard.

Additionally, increased separation is required for Emergency Bus Breaker Control at the remote shutdown panel as well as modifications to prevent undesirable closing of several feeder breakers. Preliminary information indicates that a similar problem exists on Unit 3. A follow-up report on this LER describing the deficiencies and corrective actions for Unit 3 will be forwarded prior to Unit 3 startup from the present refueling outage.

Previous Similar Occurrence:

LER 2-79-1/1T,
LER 2-79-10/1T,
LER 2-81-34/1T.

Very truly yours,



M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division - Nuclear

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &
Program Analysis