

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of  
Metropolitan Edison Co.  
(G.P.U. Nuclear)  
Three Mile Island Unit One

Docket 50-289

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman  
Victor Gilinsky  
Peter Bradford  
John F. Ahearne  
Thomas M. Roberts

Dear Chairman Palladino,

We request that the Commission uphold Mr. Harold Denton's decision to require retesting of all reactor operator license and senior reactor operator license candidates for Three Mile Island Unit One, and that the Commission deny Mr. Herman Dieckamp's request on behalf of the Licensee to set aside Mr. Denton's requirement.

As a party to the TMI-1 hearing we have listened with great interest to the extensive litigation on the questions of operator training and shift manning for TMI-1, and have read the CIE inspection report on the alleged cheating during the April, 1981, operator examinations. We point out several facts from the CIE inspection report for your consideration:

- 1) About half of the SRO examinees are management personnel, (of the 18 who passed, 11 are management, 7 are shift supervisors, including the two suspect individuals). Licensee would have us believe that no other examinees in the room noticed that the two suspected individuals were passing papers back and forth during an eight-hour test, and that the management personnel present did not see fit to ascertain that there were no improprieties as a matter of course.
- 2) The CIE report contains interviews with numerous persons who had heard rumors or had thought there might have been cheating (and many of these persons took the exam in a "non-smoking" room, perhaps with the suspected individuals),

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and yet, the Licensee failed to explore these rumors or to report them to the NRC until after the NRC had started on its own to investigate. This three-month wait to investigate rumors of cheating does not speak well of the management of the utility.

3) One of the two suspected individuals had assisted another operator in cheating on an earlier exam, and the management failed to take any disciplinary action against him, although the other operator was fired. In the OIE interview the suspected individual apparently felt he had done no wrong earlier. Although the company judged his actions "unacceptable" this was not clear enough to the suspect individual, which does not speak well for the Licensee's management.

We feel that the NRC cannot be seen as the principal guardian of any Licensee's employees' integrity and honesty. Any management which so blatantly refuses to police its own employees, whether asked to or not, and refuses to accept primary responsibilities for its employee's integrity raises serious questions by its own attitude of whether that management can be allowed to operate a nuclear power plant.

It is our opinion that this Licensee in particular places far too much burden on the NRC to catch problems which should be noticed and corrected by the Licensee's own management. We cite as an example their suit against the NRC for the costs of the accident, which we find about as reasonable as trying to hold the Motor Vehicle License Bureau liable for an accident caused by poor maintainance and driving habits.

We urge you to require that this Licensee assume a responsible attitude, which it consistently fails to do, if it is to operate at all.

Respectfully submitted,

*Gail B. Phelps*

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