NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Update Report - Previous Report Date - 2/18/81

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: N C B E P 1 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT: (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 5 (7)	EVENT DATE: 0 1 2 0 8 1 (8)	REPORT DATE: 0 8 1 4 8 1 (9)	

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal plant operation, reactor instrument penetration (RIP) valve, X53C,
0 3 shut, isolating the variable leg to level control instruments B21-LT-N004A&C, RPS
0 4 level instruments B21-L1S-N017A&B, and remote shutdown panel instrument B21-LT-3331.
0 5 This event caused a reactor scram on low level No. 1 due to feed flow fluctuations.
0 6 This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.
0 7 Technical Specifications 3.3.1, 6.9.1.9b
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S D (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	V A L V E X (14)	H (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 1	—	0 1 6	/	0 3	L	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	Z (19)	A (20)	C (21)	0 0 1 8	Y (23)	Y (24)	A (25)	A 5 5 2 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 An exhaustive investigation failed to reveal a definite cause for the RIP valve closure.
1 1 This investigation included a leak check on the valve control air supply, a timed
1 2 leak check of the valve bellows and a visual check of the valve and the valve high
1 3 flow isolation switch. This is considered an isolated event, as system air pressure
1 4 was normal and no problems could be found with the valve.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operational Event

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER R. M. Poulk, Jr. PHONE 919-457-9521

LER 1-81-16 ATTACHMENT

Facility: Unit No. 1 Date: 1-20-81

The closure of RIP X53C isolated the selected feedwater level control input instrument N004A, creating a level error signal in the feed pump control circuitry. The nature of the initial error (decreasing level) caused the feed pumps to increase speed to restore level to the normal band (32-42"). This increase in feed flow actually caused vessel level to exceed the normal band and increase to approximately 60 inches. At this time, the isolated N004A instrument began indicating an increasing vessel level and thus decreased feed pump speed, thereby decreasing vessel level. Vessel level decreased to approximately 12.5 inches, where a low level scram was initiated from level instruments N 7C & D. At no time during this event did the isolated level instrument N004A indicate out of the normal operating band. A normal scram recovery was then conducted.

This event was reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee. As no reason could be determined for the RIP valve closure and testing after the scram indicated no problems; therefore, no follow-up action was deemed necessary for the valve. To assist the operator in identifying when a level instrument important to plant safety and/or operation is affected by the operability or position of its RIP valve, selected RIP valve indication/control modules have been color coded to allow easy and rapid identification.

This event was also reviewed to determine if our level instrumentation complied with IEEE 279-1971, Section 4.7.3. This review concluded that the installed equipment was in compliance with this document. This review and its conclusions were discussed in detail with NRC personnel from both IE and ONRR.