

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 11, 1981

BLRD-50-438/81-15

BLRD-50-439/81-15

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - PIPE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR - *B*
BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRD-50-439/81-15 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on January 28, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1350. This was followed by our first interim report dated February 27, 1981. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills
L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

IE27
S
1/1

8108200324 810811
PDR ADDCK 05000438
S PDR

ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
PIPE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR
BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRD-50-439/81-15
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Condition

Pipe hangers had been attached to electrical cable tray supports. The cable tray supports are qualified to Seismic Category I. Because there is no allowance in the seismic analyses for the attachment of pipe hangers to these supports, the seismic analysis of the cable tray supports was suspect.

In addition, TVA identified a potential procedure problem in that these pipe hangers had been attached to electrical cable tray supports without final approval by TVA's Division of Engineering Design (EN DES). This occurrence is entirely in keeping with the process established between the EN DES and Construction (CONST) project managers. This process allows for pipe runs to be installed upon receipt of an "interim" approval from an onsite representative of the EN DES project manager. A "final" approval by the EN DES project manager had not yet been received by CONST because the relevant drawings had yet to be reviewed.

Safety Implications

The procedure of issuing "interim" and "final" approval could have increased the possibility that inadequate or interfering pipe hangers could have been installed. Had the defective pipe hangers been subjected to loading situations not evaluated by EN DES, it is possible that the hangers, cable tray supports or the equipment they support could have been damaged during a seismic event. Had the equipment been safety related, the safety of operations of the plant may have been affected.

Corrective Action

CONST was informed that final approval by the EN DES project manager had to be received before they could attach pipe hangers to other systems supports. The interim approved hangers on this NCR were reviewed by EN DES and approved or disapproved on a case-by-case basis. The EN DES project manager transmitted this information to CONST for implementation. All supports will receive EN DES final approval before final inspection in order to maintain seismic qualification.