

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 A L B R F 3 00 - 000000 - 00 41111 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 6 05000296 7 072381 8 081481 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During normal operation, containment atmosphere monitor (CAM) H₂O₂ analyzer B
03 sample return valves could not be energized. See T.S. 3.7.H.2. H₂O₂ analyzer A
04 was operable. There was no danger to the health or safety of the public. There
05 were no previous similar events.
06
07
08

09 SYSTEM CODE S A 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE I N T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE E 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 81 EVENT YEAR 81 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 037 OCCURRENCE CODE 03 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A 18 X 19 A 20 B 21 0045 Y 23 Y 24 L 25 V 030 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Valcore Engineering Corporation model V52630-529-1 solenoid assembly FSV-76-67 failed
11 to operate due to a shorted bridge rectifier and coil. In addition, a voltage supply
12 wire was found loose due to a broken screw head. The solenoid assembly was replaced
13 and SI 4.7.D.1.B-1(A) and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed. See attached for
14 recurrence control.

15 FACILITY STATUS F 28 POWER 1000 29 OTHER STAT NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator observed 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
16 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 43 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
20 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NRC USE ONLY

21 8108200184 810814 PDR ADOCK 05000296 PDR Gene Holder (205) 729-6134
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-296/81037 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.H.2.
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.2 *Date due NRC: 8/22/81
Date of Occurrence 7/23/81 Time of Occurrence: 0815 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

During normal operation, containment atmosphere monitor (CAM) H₂O₂ analyzer B sample return valves could not be energized. The solenoid lead wire and relays R2, R5, and 86-76-92A were damaged.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in refueling outage
Unit 2 at 99%.
Unit 3 at 100%.

Action Specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

None

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Solenoid coils assembly for FSV-76-67 failed to operate due to a shorted bridge rectifier and coil. A voltage supply wire was found loose due to a broken screw head. Inadequate design information lead to improper flex conduit connections at FSV-76-67 which allowed the solenoid assembly to be exposed to torus environment, permitting corrosion. Corrosion on bridge rectifier failure possibly prevented dissipation of heat and contributed to rectifier failure. Screw was probably overtightened by manufacturer.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health or safety of the public, no release of activity, no damage to the plant or equipment, and no resulting significant chain of events.

Corrective Action: Replaced FSV-76-67 solenoid assembly and relays R2, R5 and 86-76-92A. Flex conduit connections for FSV-76-63, 76-65, and 76-67 sealed by taping with Scotch 70 and covered with Scotch 33+. Flex connector at body end of FSV-76-67 was replaced. SI 4.7.D.1.B-1(A) and 4.7.H. were successfully completed. H₂O₂ valves inside the drywell on unit 3 will be checked during the next opportunity for drywell entry. Consideration is being given to moving these valves outside the torus and drywell.

At a minimum, the torus flex connectors will be replaced during the next refueling outage. These valves are outside the torus and drywell on units 1 and 3.

Failure Data:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor