

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

2	1
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W	I	P	B	H	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
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7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 7 8

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6 7 0 7 1 6 8 1 8 0 7 3 1 8 1 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During the performance of high and low head safety injection check valve
03 leakage test, TS-30, on 7-14-81, leakage in excess of the acceptance
04 criteria for 1-853C&D was noted. Check valves 1-853C&D are the first
05 off check valves from the reactor coolant system for the low head safety
06 injection core deluge lines. On 7-16-81, valves 1-853C&D were opened up
07 and found stuck in the full open position. This occurrence is
08 reportable in accordance with T.S. 15.6.9.2.A.9.

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE				COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE			
S	F	B	A	V	A	L	V	E	X	C	A				
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20				
EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.							
8	1	0	1	0	/	0	1	T	0						
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31					
ACTION TAKEN		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
F	X	C	Z	0	0	0	0	Y	Y	N	V	0	8	5	
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 On 7-16-81, valves 1-853C&D were found stuck in the full open position
1 1 due to interference between the disc wire and the valve body. Similar
1 2 valves were inspected with no abnormalities noted. Disc wires on valves
1 3 1-853A, B, C and D were replaced with cotter pins to prevent further
1 4 valve hanger binding. Inspections of valves of similar design are
7 8 9 planned on Unit 2. 8

1 5 G 28 0 0 0 29 N/A C 31 Surveillance testing

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z (33) N/A (34) N/A

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	N/A	(39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	N/A

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12	
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)																							
TYPE		DESCRIPTION																					
1	9	Z	(42)	N/A																			

8 9 10
PUBLCITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0 N (44) N/A
S PDR
8108110540 810731
PDR ADOCK 05000266
S PDR
NRC USE ONLY
68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER C. W. Fay

PHONE: 414/277-2811

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 81-010/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-266

During the performance of high and low head safety injection check valve leakage test TS-30 during a unit shut-down on July 14, 1981, leakage in excess of six gallons per minute past 1-853 C&D was noted. The acceptance criteria for the leak test is leakage less than or equal to five gallons per minute. Check valves 1-853 C&D are the first off check valves from the reactor coolant system for the low head safety injection core deluge lines.

On July 16, 1981, valves 1-853 C&D were opened up and found to be stuck in the full open position. Further investigation revealed that the valve operating arm hanger for both valves was stuck in the full open position due to interference between the disc unit lock wire (disc wire) and the valve body. Two other valves of similar design, 1-853 A&B, were inspected with no abnormalities noted.

The manufacturer's nameplate data for the affected valves are as follows:

Manufacturer:	Velan
Type:	Swing Check
Pressure Rating:	1500 #ASA
Size:	6"
Drawing:	78704, Rev. B

The disc wires on check valves 1-853 A, B, C, and D were replaced with cotter pins to prevent further valve hanger binding on July 16, 1981. Following repairs to the check valves disc wires, satisfactory leak checks were completed on July 17, 1981.

An investigation is presently underway to determine existence of other valves of similar design and construction in Units 1 and 2 for further evaluation.

At no time during this occurrence was there any danger to the public's health and safety. Backup isolation for 1-853 C&D was provided by a check valve and a motor-operated gate valve in series downstream of 1-853 C&D. It is impossible to determine when the valves initially became open. Shortly after the leak test on July 14, 1981 full flow was passed through 1-853 C&D in an effort to reduce back leakage. Full flow through valves 1-853 C&D could have jammed the valves in the open position.

This occurrence is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.9, "performance of structures, systems, or components that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than that assumed in the accident analysis report or Technical Specification basis."

After review of this occurrence by the Manager's Supervisory Staff and the Nuclear Engineering Section Safety Review Committee, it was determined that the cause of the valve jamming was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 21. Notification of the defect was reported on July 16, 1981 via 24-hour written notification for Licensee Event Report No. 81-010/01T-0.