

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK										(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)									
/V/A/N/A/S/_ (2)		/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3)				/4/1/1/1/1/ (4)				/_/_/_ (5)									
LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER				LICENSE TYPE				CAT									
REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6)		/0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7)				/0/7/0/3/8/1/ (8)				/0/7/3/0/8/1/ (9)									
		DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE									
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)																			
/0/2/	During Mode 1 operation on July 3 and 8, 1981, the containment average air tem-																		
/0/3/	perature exceeded the upper Technical Specification limit of 105°F. Since the																		
/0/4/	containment bulk air temperature was restored to within the limit of T.S. 3.6.1.5/																		
/0/5/	within the allowed 8 hours on each occasion, the public health and safety were																		
/0/6/	not affected. The events are reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.																		
/0/7/																			
/0/8/																			
	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE													
/0/9/	/S/B/ (11)	/X/ (12)	/Z/ (13)	/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14)	/Z/ (15)	/Z/ (16)													
(17)	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.													
	/8/1/	/-/	/0/5/1/	/ \ /	/0/3/	/L/	/-/	/0/											
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER											
/X/ (18)	/X/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/Z/ (25)	/Z/9/9/9/ (26)											

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/	/ Both high containment temperatures resulted from a temporary loss of cooling /										
/1/1/	/ medium. The first high temperature occurred when the mechanical chiller tripped /										
/1/2/	/ while attempting to parallel with the steam chiller and the second event resulted/										
/1/3/	/ from degraded service water flow during a test. Temperature was reduced by plac-/										
/1/4/	/ ing the steam chiller in service and by returning service water flow to normal. /										
FACILITY		STATUS		%POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	
/1/5/	/D/ (28)	/0/3/3/ (29)	/ NA /	(30)	/A/ (31)	/ Operator Observation /					
ACTIVITY		CONTENT		RELEASED		OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)		LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /		/ NA /						
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION (39)					
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /								
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION (41)							
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /									
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE		DESCRIPTION (43)							
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /									
PUBLICITY		ISSUED		DESCRIPTION (45)		NRC USE ONLY					
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /			/ / / / / / / / / / / / /						

Description of Event

On July 3 and 8, 1981, during Mode 1 operation, the containment average air temperature exceeded the upper Technical Specification limit of 105°F. These events are reportable pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since on both occasions the containment bulk air temperature was restored to within the limit of T.S. 3.6.1.5 within the allowed 8 hours, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The unit is presently operating with a containment air temperature close to the upper limit and thus any change in cooling water lineup or flow can have enough of an effect to cause the temperature to increase above the 105°F limit. Both high containment average air temperatures resulted from the temporary degrading of an associated cooling medium. The high containment air temperature on July 3 was caused by a temporary loss of chilled water flow to the containment recirculation air cooling coils when the mechanical chiller unit tripped while attempting to parallel with the steam chiller. The high temperature on July 8 resulted from degraded service water flow to the component cooling heat exchangers during periodic testing of a service water pump.

Immediate Corrective Action

Containment air temperature was reduced to below the 105°F limit by placing the steam chiller in service for the first occurrence and returning service water flow to normal for the second.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The high containment heat load which appears to exist is presently being investigated. The performance of each containment recirculation air heat exchanger is being evaluated to determine if any cooling coils have degraded. Plans also include checking all ring duct exhaust dampers open and vent seals closed during the next Mode 3 outage and inspecting insulation on various components such as the reactor head and steam generator supports for heat losses during the next refueling.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required at this time.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.