

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 31, 1981

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HTRD-50-518/81-15, -519/81-11,
-520/81-13, -521/81-11
PBRD-50-553/81-16, -554/81-09

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY -
RCIC STEAM LINE BREAK - HTRD-50-518/81-15, -519/81-11, -520/81-13,
-521/81-11, PBRD-50-553/81-16, -554/81-09

The subject deficiencies were initially reported to NRC-OIE, Region II, Inspector F. S. Cantrell on June 30, 1981 as NCR's HTA NEB 81-03, HTB NEB 81-04, and PBN NEB 81-02. In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the first interim report on the subject deficiencies. TVA anticipates transmitting the next report on or before September 30, 1981. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this nonconformance. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

for L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS
RCIC STEAM LINE BREAK
HTRD-50-518/81-15, -519/81-11, -520/81-13, -521/81-11
PBRD-50-553/81-16, -554/81-09
10 CFR PART 50.55(e) REPORT NO. 1 (INTERIM)

Description of Deficiency

Due to a design deficiency, in case of an RCIC steam line rupture in the RCIC room, the residual heat removal 1-A (RHR-A) equipment located in the RCIC room will be exposed to an environment for which it is not qualified.

Interim Progress

GE is in the process of evaluating this deficiency to determine the necessary corrective action to prevent occurrence of the above-described events. GE has proposed to correct the problem by adding a new normally closed valve to be located in the pipe chase between the steam tunnel and the RCIC pump room. This valve would be dc powered with a one-inch bypass. The one-inch line would limit flow in the case of a downstream break. We are continuing our investigation into this matter and will supply a second report containing General Electric's corrective action by September 30, 1981.