TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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July 27, 1981

YCRD-50-566/81-16
YCRD-50-567/81-13

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REBAR LEFT OUT OF CONCRETE POUR - YCRD-50-566/81-16, YCRD-50-567/81-13 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on June 29, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR YC-197. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
REBAR LEFT OUT OF CONCRETE POUR
YCRD-50-566/81-16, YCRD-50-567/81-13
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Concrete pour No. W-H6 was split into two pours W-H6 (east) and W-H6 (west) so that those portions that were not on "hold" by TVA could be poured. W-H6 (west) was to be poured while the "hold" only affected the W-H6 (east) part of the pour. The preliminary work needed before pouring was completed on concrete pour W-H6 (west) and concrete was placed. Subsequently it was discovered that the top face rebars (23) of pour W-H6 (east) were supposed to have extended into pour W-H6 (west) 21 inches.

The apparent cause is that the craft, engineers, and Quality Control-Civil field inspectors failed to notice that the top face rebars of pour W-H6 (east) extended into W-H6 (west) 21 inches. The Quality Control-Civil inspectors who made the inspection takeoff checklist for W-H6 (west) had noticed them and included them on the checklist. However, they were subsequently missed by the field inspector who signed off the W-H6 (west) pour as being acceptable.

Safety Implications

Concrete pour No. W-H6 is part of a floor in the Waste Management Building. Had this subject deficiency gone uncorrected, there is a possibility that the floor might crack or be otherwise damaged. Because the volume reduction equipment is located in the area of the pour, damage to the floor could result in damage to the equipment, and a possible release of radioactive waste.

Corrective Action

Quality Control Investigation Report (QCIR) No. 36076 and nonconformance report (NCR) No. YC-197 were written to document this problem. The NCR was evaluated by TVA and the disposition was to drill 19 holes into the W-H6 (west) pour to a depth of 24 inches and grout rebar splices in accordance with TVA Construction Specification G-32. The top face bars of pour W-H6 (east) were subsequently spliced with the grouted splice bars. To prevent a recurrence Project Engineering-Civil will monitor the installation of rebar for double assurance that all rebar is installed in accordance with drawings. Quality Control-Civil will continue to perform quality control inspections, using an independently verified checklist, and will be held responsible for verification that rebar has been installed in accordance with drawings and specifications. Quality Control-Civil inspectors were instructed on June 15, 1981 by the Materials and Civil Quality Control Unit supervisor that:

(1) Takeoff checklist reviewers should always consult with the original preparer of the checklist if a discrepancy is discovered.

(2) Inspections should be initiated on the takeoff checklist on the day that they are made in order not to overlook any item.

The corrective action was completed on July 5, 1981.