

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

June 29, 1981

ALL: 20

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT
50-327/81-18 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS


The subject inspection report dated June 2, 1981 cited TVA with two
Severity Level V Violations in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201. Enclosed
is our response to those violations as discussed with C. D. Perny on
June 29, 1981.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at
FTS 857-2581.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are
complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS

Violation 327/81-18-01

10 CFR 73.55(c)(1) requires that access to vital equipment shall require passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of 73.55(a). 10 CFR 73.2(f)(2) defines physical barriers as building walls, ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinderblock, concrete, steel or comparable materials (openings which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening). Section 5.2.1 of the licensee's security plan states that all vital area barriers will be resistant to penetration. The penetration resistance of the barriers will not be diminished by doors, windows, and other openings in the barrier. Additionally, section 3.1.2.2 of the security plan states that roof and exterior wall penetrations of plant buildings (air intake, exhaust openings, etc.) larger than 81 square inches shall be grilled. Overlapping steel bars, grills, etc., will be constructed to ensure that openings are no larger than 9 square inches.

Contrary to the above, openings greater than 81 square inches, in the roof of the Emergency Raw Cooling Water building, a vital area, were not covered by a grill.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement III.E).

Admission or Denial of Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

Reason for Violation

Failure to recognize that the subject opening violated the requirements of the plant's security plan.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved

Heavy gauge iron plates approximately 18 inches wide by 3 to 4 feet long have been welded in place in order to reduce the subject openings to an acceptable size (less than 81 square inches). This was accomplished by May 22, 1981.

Actions Taken to Prevent Further Noncompliance

A review of designated vital areas revealed no further areas of noncompliance.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

We are now in full compliance.

Violation 327/81-18-02

10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) requires the licensee to control all points of personnel and vehicle access into the protected area. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure to assure their ability to respond or to summon assistance. Sections 3.2.1.4.3 and 3.2.2.4 of the licensee's security plan state that Post 3 is responsible for all vehicles entering the protected area. The vehicle access portal will be manned by a Public Safety Officer when open and observed from the access control portal.

Contrary to the above, the last access control function was not being performed by Post 3 in the bullet resistance structure in that at 4:00 p.m., on May 12, 1981, the inspector observed a security officer unlock the protected area vehicle gate and allow a vehicle to exit without notifying Post 3 that the gate was going to be opened.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement III.E).

Admission or Denial of Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

Reason for Violation

The cause of this violation was a security employee oversight.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved

The individual officers responsible for the violation were reinstructed of their responsibilities through informal management discussions and the issuance of Memorandum Instruction No. 50.

Actions Taken to Prevent Further Noncompliance

All officers and supervisors have reviewed "Post Orders for Vehicle Gate Control" as well as all section instruction letters. A Memorandum Instruction (MI-50) was issued with additional guidance to avoid any further noncompliance.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

We are now in full compliance.