

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 23, 1981



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 81-01 - RII:JPO 50-259,  
-260, -296 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

In our response to the subject bulletin dated March 13, 1981 as confirmed by R. C. Lewis' letter to H. G. Parris dated June 12, 1981, TVA committed to inspect certain snubbers. Enclosed are the results of these inspections which were performed on unit 1. Additional reports will be submitted for units 2 and 3 after inspections are performed during each unit's next refueling outage. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*  
L. M. Mills, Manager

Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

IEI/  
3  
1/1

8108040073 810723  
PDR ADOCK 05000259  
G PDR

ENCLOSURE  
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO OIE BULLETIN 81-01  
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
(50-259)

All INC mechanical snubbers installed in unit 1 were visually examined and functionally tested for proper activation and drag force during the refueling outage which began in April 1981. The maximum acceptable drag force for the type MSAV, size 1, snubbers was determined to be 10 pounds in both tension and compression. Rather than taking a 10 percent sample of the 14 snubbers, all were subjected to the drag force test and activation was verified. The tests were performed in accordance with the June 23, 1981, revision of plant instruction BF MMI-59D. The portions which apply to INC snubbers are as follows:

9.1 See CAUTION. International Nuclear Safe Guard (sic) Corporation snubbers on the two Yarway columns are to be tested for freedom of movement in both tension and compression.

9.1.1 Disconnect the snubber from the pipe and measure the drag force required for motion along the line of action in both tension and compression. Record force for each snubber on page 9a.

CAUTION: Do not move Yarway piping to an extreme degree at locations remote from snubber attachments.

9.1.2 Remove force gauge and check that snubber actuates (resists) when a sudden load is applied by hand.

9.1.3 Remove all test equipment and reconnect snubber to the pipe.

All 14 INC mechanical snubbers were determined to be acceptable. This action and report completes the requirements for item 2 of the bulletin and the applicable portions of item 4 for reporting the results.

The other mechanical snubbers installed in safety-related systems in unit 1 are all Pacific Scientific Company Model PSA-10 and PSA-3 and were functionally tested during the current refueling/modification outage according to plant instructions BF MMI-59D, paragraphs 9.3 through 9.3.3, and the requirements of your June 12, 1981, letter. A copy of the pertinent portion of the plant instruction was included in my letter of March 13, 1981.

The quantity of snubbers that were functionally tested is summarized as follows:

The 28 snubbers not previously tested were tested.

Two of the lot tested in September 1977 were retested. They are mark numbers 71A1 and 71A2.

One of the lot tested in November 1978 was retested. Its mark number is 71G2.

The PSA-3 snubber, MSS-4, was tested.

No inoperable Pacific Scientific mechanical snubbers were identified during this surveillance and testing. This completes for unit 1 the requirements of the bulletin's item 3 and the applicable portions of item 4 for reporting the results.