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DUKE POWER COMPANY REGION II
POWER BUILDING ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 28, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-73. This report concerns the operability of the RHR valve, 1ND1B. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

IE22
5/11

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-73

Report Date: May 28, 1981

Occurrence Date: April 28, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: Valve 1ND1B would not reopen at the completion of its periodic stroke test.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 5

Description of Occurrence: On April 28, 1981 at 1810 hours, both trains of the RHR (ND) system were removed from service for periodic testing of valves 1ND1B and 1ND2A. At the completion of the test, 1ND1B would not reopen. This placed the plant in a degraded mode of operation as stated in Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: 1ND1B would not reopen after its stroke test. The cause of this incident is unknown.

Analysis of Occurrence: Both 1ND1B and 1ND2A are located in a common line off the hot leg of NC loop 3. The valves are periodically stroked to verify operability. When either valve is closed, both ND trains become inoperable. At the end of the periodic test, 1ND1B would not reopen. An operator was immediately dispatched to manually open the valve, and the system was returned to an operable status at 1830 hours on April 28, 1981.

Corrective Action: When the limit switches were adjusted, the valve was cycled and found to be working properly.

Safety Analysis: This incident did not affect the health and safety of the public. The operators knew that both trains of ND would be inoperable during the stroke testing of 1ND1B and 1ND2A. No operations were underway which would cause a dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration, and the core outlet temperature was always $\geq 10^{\circ}\text{F}$ sub-cooled. The fact that 1ND1B would not reopen, only slightly extended the time that both ND trains were inoperable.