

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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
WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

June 26, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-287



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/81-13. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *by WAH*

JLJ:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/81-13

Report Date: June 26, 1981

Occurrence Date: May 23, 1981

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Breaching of Fire Barrier in Unit 3
Control Room

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: At 1400 hours on May 28, 1981, a 1-inch breach in a 3-hour fire barrier was discovered in the floor of the Unit 3 Control Room just outside of the Shift Supervisor's office. The void had been covered by carpet since initial construction and was found while replacing the carpet. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.17.5 and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident cannot be clearly defined because the breach had been covered since construction of the Unit 3 Control Room.

Analysis of Occurrence: Due to the low combustibility of materials, the small size of the breach, and the smoke detectors located on both sides of the breach, the possibility of a fire spreading was very low. Additionally, the Control Room is continuously manned. Therefore, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: The repair of this breach was performed by Mechanical Maintenance technicians using the troubleshooting procedure MP/O/A/1800/22. The breach was a threaded pipe sleeve. The threads were chased with a 1-inch pipe die to clean them. Two 1-inch pipe plugs were then installed to seal the barrier. The penetration has been assigned the number 3-C-F-158 and will be placed on inspection procedure MP/O/A/3020/05.