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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

June 5, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-80. This report concerns Train B of the RHR System inoperable when the plant entered Mode 5. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-80

Report Date: June 4, 1981

Occurrence Date: May 8, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: Train B of the Residual Heat Removal (ND) System was inoperable when the plant entered Mode 5.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 5, Prior to initial criticality.

Description of Occurrence: At 1100 hours on May 8, 1981, the plant entered Mode 5 (reactor vessel head fully tensioned) without having both trains of the ND System operable. This was reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Operations personnel were not fully aware that the head tensioning was complete and did not take the steps necessary to prevent entering Mode 5 without having ND Train B operable. In addition, there were no procedures which indicated what prerequisites must be met prior to entering Mode 5 from Mode 6.

Analysis of Occurrence: At 1400 hours on May 5, 1981, valve 1NI-178 (ND pump B discharge to Safety Injection (NI) System) was red tagged closed in order to repair 1NI-81 (Cold leg accumulator C discharge check valve). Thus, ND Train B was inoperable during this time. The Shift Supervisor on duty on May 8 (0800-1600 hours) knew that ND Train B was inoperable but was not aware that the reactor vessel head tensioning would be completed during his shift. Also, no Operations' procedures existed with sign off steps which indicated what prerequisites must be met prior to entering Mode 5 from Mode 6. The head tensioning was completed at 1100 hours on May 8 but Operations' personnel were not notified until 1350 hours. Evidently, the personnel tensioning the head were not aware of the importance of notifying Operations when the head was tensioned. In addition, Maintenance procedure, Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement, did not contain steps to notify Operations' personnel while the head was being tensioned.

Valve 1NI-81 was repaired and 1NI-178 was operable (red tag removed and breaker energized) at 0550 hours on May 9, 1981.

Safety Analysis: Since there was only new fuel in the core, no decay heat was present. ND Train A was available for other purposes if needed. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected. If the reactor had been at power and a mode change was required, Operating Procedure, Controlling Procedure for Unit startup, outlines the steps necessary to take the plant from a cold shutdown (Mode 5) to 15% full power (Mode 1). ND Train A could also be used if needed to help remove decay heat.

Corrective Action: An operating procedure will be written to verify that prerequisites are met before entering Mode 5 from Mode 6. This procedure will reference various Mode 5 periodic tests and Operations' logs.

The Maintenance Procedure will be changed to include the above operating procedure as a prerequisite sign off step before the head is tensioned. In addition, sign off steps to notify Operations' personnel during various stages of head tensioning will also be included.