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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

July 8, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-97. This report concerns Technical Specification 3.3.3.; "As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be operable." This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

  
William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/pw  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management and Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
P. O. Box 10412  
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham  
Resident Inspector - NRC  
McGuire Nuclear Station



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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION  
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-97

Report Date: July 8, 1981

Occurrence Date: June 12, 1981

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Cornelius, N.C.

Identification of Occurrence: Several fire zones were declared inoperable due to an insufficient quantity of installed detection instruments.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 5, Cold Shutdown

Description of Occurrence: On June 12, 1981 it was discovered that the quantity of fire detection equipment installed in five (5) fire zones did not comply with the minimum requirement listed in Table 3.3-11 of McGuire Technical Specifications. These discrepancies were brought to the attention of the Shift Supervisor who immediately declared the fire protection instrumentation in the affected fire zones inoperable. This constituted a reportable incident pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 and required instituting an hourly fire watch as stipulated by the appropriate action statement.

Apparent Cause: The discrepancy in one fire zone (#106) was the result of a typographical error in Table 3.3-11. The other four fire zones (around each of the four Reactor Coolant pumps) were analyzed and the quantity installed was determined to be sufficient.

Analysis of Occurrence: An operations engineer discovered that the quantity of fire detection equipment installed in Fire Zone #106 and each of the Reactor Coolant pump zones did not agree with the minimum number required by the Technical Specifications. A check of the blue prints confirmed that the instruments that were installed were in accordance with the number and type stipulated by the drawings.

Design Engineering was contacted and asked to determine if additional fire protection equipment was needed. After being notified of the discrepancies, the Shift Supervisor on duty declared the affected fire zones inoperable until the differences could be resolved. Hourly fire patrols were established as required. It was discovered that the inconsistency existing in fire zone #106 between the Technical Specification Table 3.3-11 and the equipment installed was the result of a typographical error in the Technical Specifications.

Fire Zones #147, 148, 149 and 150 (each of the four reactor coolant pump areas) were re-evaluated by the Design Engineering group and it was decided that the equipment installed met the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association, NFPA-72E-1974.

Steam Production submitted letters to the NRC requesting permission to make appropriate changes in Table 3.3-11 to reflect the correct number of fire protection equipment necessary in each area.

Fire Zone #106 was declared operable on June 15, 1981; the remaining fire zones were declared operable on June 19, 1981.

Corrective Action: The initial response to this incident was to establish hourly fire patrols in the affected areas. A re-examination of the installed fire protection equipment revealed a typographical error in Table 3.3-11 affecting fire zone #106. It was ascertained that the equipment in Zones 147, 148, 149 and 150 was adequate. Letters were sent to the NRC requesting the approval of the existing equipment and the subsequent changes to the Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification changes were approved on June 19, 1981.

Safety Analysis: The fire detection equipment is designed to give prompt detection and location of fires in their early stages. Thus, the potential for damage to safety-related equipment would be minimized. It was determined that the type and quantity of fire protection equipment installed met the standards of the NFPA-72E-1974; hence the safe operation of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.