

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

OFFICIAL COPY

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

June 25, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-92. This report concerns Technical Specification 3.3.3.6; "The Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be operable." This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


  
William O. Parker, Jr.

PBN/pw  
Attachments

cc: Director  
Office of Management & Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
P. O. Box 10412  
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham  
Resident Inspector - NRC  
McGuire Nuclear Station



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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION  
INCIDENT REPORT

LER/RO Report Number: 81-092/03L-0

Report Date: June 25, 1981

Occurrence Date: May 30, 1981

Licensee: Duke Power Company

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Docket No.: 05000369

Identification of Occurrence: The Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate Instrumentation for Accident Monitoring was declared inoperable.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 3, Hot Standby

Description of Occurrence: On May 30, 1981 at 0900 hours, a work request was initiated to troubleshoot the Steam Generator (S/G) "D" Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Instrumentation failure. The flow gauge indicator in the Control Room was pegged high. At 2000 hours that same day, the plant was entering Mode 3 from Mode 4, hence, the instrument was declared inoperable. This was a reportable incident pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The S/G "D" Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Monitoring Instrumentation became inoperable due to failed transmitters. One transmitter (Rosemount, Model 1151) was sending a faulty 74 milliamp signal, and another transmitter (Barton 386A) had burned resistors on its circuit board.

Analysis of Occurrence: On May 30, 1981 at 2000 hours, the plant was entering Mode 3 from Mode 4. The S/G "D" Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Instrumentation was pegged high, hence, it was declared inoperable. Repair work immediately began on the equipment and it was found that the Rosemount transmitter was sending a 74 milliamp signal. The transmitter was replaced since it could not be calibrated. The Barton transmitter, which sends a signal to the Control Room indicator, was found to have burned resistors on its circuit board. A similar type of transmitter from Unit 2 was transferred to Unit 1 and the transmitter was replaced. At that time the plant had dropped down to Mode 4 from Mode 3 due to a non-related reason. When the Barton transmitter was placed in service, the same components were burned. This transmitter was replaced 4 times but all of them were burned the same way. It was suspected that the power supply of the transmitter may have been causing the problem, hence, the power supply was taken out. The transmitter was also replaced.

Safety Analysis: The auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters are used to provide indications for accident monitoring. They do not provide controls or interlocks to the pumps and valves of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. If the plant had been at normal operation, and a normal or abnormal shutdown was required, the inoperability of these instruments would not have affected the Auxiliary Feedwater System in providing and maintaining its necessary functions. Therefore, the plant's safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The Rosemount transmitter was replaced and calibrated per procedure, "Calibration Procedure for Rosemount Models 1151 GP, 1151 DP, and 1151 AP Pressure Transmitters". The Barton transmitter was also replaced with a similar type of transmitter from Unit 2 and was calibrated. The power supply for the Barton transmitter will be replaced.

The plant was brought down to Mode 4 from Mode 3 within the required time limit specified in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6.