

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 21 26 30 37 42 48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83 88 93 98CON'T
01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 0 6 2 6 8 1 0 7 2 4 8 1 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 81 86 91 96 101 106 111 116 121 126 131 136 141 146 151 156 161 166 171 176 181 186 191 196 201 206 211 216 221 226 231 236 241 246 251 256 261 266 271 276 281 286 291 296 301 306 311 316 321 326 331 336 341 346 351 356 361 366 371 376 381 386 391 396 401 406 411 416 421 426 431 436 441 446 451 456 461 466 471 476 481 486 491 496 501 506 511 516 521 526 531 536 541 546 551 556 561 566 571 576 581 586 591 596 601 606 611 616 621 626 631 636 641 646 651 656 661 666 671 676 681 686 691 696 701 706 711 716 721 726 731 736 741 746 751 756 761 766 771 776 781 786 791 796 801 806 811 816 821 826 831 836 841 846 851 856 861 866 871 876 881 886 891 896 901 906 911 916 921 926 931 936 941 946 951 956 961 966 971 976 981 986 991 996

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With the unit at 100% power, it was discovered that inside recirculation spray HX
03 service water radiation monitoring pump 2-SW-P-58 would not operate. This is
04 contrary to T.S.-3.4.2.A.2 and reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2). Failure of the
05 pump would not affect performance of the heat exchanger. In addition, the discharge
06 tunnel radiation monitor provides backup radiation monitoring capability. There-
07 fore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 1
18 ACTION TAKEN B 18
19 FUTURE ACTION F 19
20 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20
21 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21
22 HOURS 0 0 0 0
23 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23
24 NRC-4 FORM SUB. N 24
25 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25
26 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER V 1 2 5
27 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Sediment in the service water had dried and hardened on the pump internals, prevent-
11 ing the pump from rotating. The pump was cleaned, adjusted, and tested. A design
12 change in progress will provide the capability to flush the pumps.

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15 FACILITY STATUS E 28
16 % POWER 1 0 0 29
17 OTHER STATUS N/A 30
18 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31
19 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Observation 32

15 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33
16 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY Z 34
17 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 35
18

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37
18 TYPE Z 38
19 DESCRIPTION N/A 39

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40
19 DESCRIPTION N/A 41

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42
20 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

20 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44
21 DESCRIPTION N/A 45

20 NRC USE ONLY
21

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-041-03L-0
EVENT DATE: 06-28-81

INOPERABLE SERVICE WATER PUMP

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With Unit 2 at 100% power, an attempt was made to start 2-SW-P-5B (inside recirculation spray service water radiation monitoring pump) to compare its operation to 2-SW-P-5A which was undergoing preventative maintenance. It was discovered that 2-SW-P-5B would not operate. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.4.2.A.2 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

Pump 2-SW-P-5B takes suction from the service water discharge of one of the four recirculation spray heat exchangers. Failure of 2-SW-P-5B would not affect performance of its associated heat exchanger. In addition, the discharge tunnel radiation monitor provides backup radiation monitoring capability; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The pump would not operate because sediment from the service water had dried and hardened on the pump internals, preventing the pump from rotating.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to declare the pump inoperable and initiate a maintenance request.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The failed pump was cleaned, readjusted, and then tested and verified to operate.

6. ACTION TO PREVENT OCCURRENCE:

As a result of Design Change 80-56, currently underway, piping for the recirculation spray heat exchanger radiation monitors is being changed, which will provide a means for flushing the radiation monitor pumps. This should prevent buildup of material in the pump.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

The modifications described in Section 6 will also be implemented on Unit 1.