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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

May 26, 1981



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-70. This report concerns cold leg accumulator 'C' being declared inoperable. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-70

Report Date: May 26, 1981

Occurrence Date: April 26, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: Cold leg injection accumulator C declared inoperable due to high level.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Mode 3, Hot Standby

Description of Occurrence: At 1230 hours on April 26, 1981, cold leg injection accumulator C was declared inoperable. The accumulator C high level alarm (64.5%) was received in the Control Room. This indicated that the contained volume of water was above 8496 gallons and thus, reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 3.5.1.1.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cold leg accumulator C discharge check valves were leaking which allowed reactor coolant (NC) system water to fill the accumulator above its alarm setpoint.

Analysis of Occurrence: A periodic test, Reactor Coolant Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test, performed April 25-28 found that cold leg accumulator C discharge check valves were leaking past their seats. At the time of the incident, NC system pressure was greater than 1000 psig and cold leg accumulator C pressure was approximately 425 psig. Since the discharge check valves were leaking, the NC system filled the accumulator above its high level alarm setpoint.

Safety Analysis: The cold leg accumulators are passive and would only be used during an accident involving a large NC system break. Since there was only new fuel in the core, safe plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected. If the reactor had been at power and a large NC system break had occurred, cold leg accumulator C would have functioned as designed because the water level was close to its alarm setpoint. Furthermore, the accident analysis indicates that the contents of only three accumulators need to be injected in order to limit the peak fuel clad temperature at or below the maximum allowable during an accident.

Corrective action: No corrective action was taken to reduce level since pressurizer pressure was reduced below 1000 psig at 1426 hours on April 26, 1981. Thus, Technical Specification requirement 3.5.1.1 was no longer applicable. Work Requests were written to repair the leaking valves. After the valves are repaired, they will be retested.