

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
 /0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/6/0/9/8/1/ (8) /0/7/0/7/8/1/ (9)
 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On June 9, 1981 during Mode 1 operation, the solid state protection system /
 /0/3/ / train B "stop valve-Generator Trip" logic failed to meet the acceptance criter- /
 /0/4/ / ia of 2-PT-36.1B. The logic was restored within the requirements of the T.S. /
 /0/5/ / 3.3.1.1 action statement, therefore the health and safety of the public was not /
 /0/6/ / affected. This item is reportable pursuant to T S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
 /0/7/ / /
 /0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/ /I/E/ (11)	/E/ (12)	/E/ (13)	/I/N/S/T/R/U/ (14)	/Y/ (15)	/Z/ (16)
LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17) REPORT NUMBER	/8/1/	/-/	/0/4/7/	/ \ /	/0/3/
	/L/	/-/	/0/		

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/A/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/N/ (25)	/W/1/2/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The logic failure was traced to a faulty Universal Card (A404). The card was /
 /1/1/ / replaced and the logic channel returned to service after calibration. /
 /1/2/ / /
 /1/3/ / /
 /1/4/ / /

FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/A/ (31)	/ Surveillance Test /

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)	
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /	
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)		
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /		
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)		
/1/9/ /Z/ (42)	/ NA /		
PUBLICITY			

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/ /N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
NAME OF PREPARER	W. R. CARTWRIGHT	PHONE (703) 894-5151

Description of Event

During the performance of the Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Test (2-PT-36.1B), the positioning of the logic test switch (Position 18) in the SSPS train B resulted in a "logic-fault" light on the test panel indicating a failure in the logic circuit. Investigation revealed a failed universal card in the train. The reactor trip logic from the closure of turbine stop valves (4 of 4 logic) was the trip feature affected.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The reactor trip from the closure of all stop valves provides a loss of heat sink protection by providing for a reactor trip when above 10% power (P-7). Since the faulted channel was restored within the requirements of the T.S. 3.3.1.1 action statement and the redundant train remained operable to provide a reactor trip if all stop valves were closed, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Event

This event was caused by the failure of the universal card (A404) in the SSPS train B logic.

Immediate Corrective Action

The faulted card was replaced, the channel calibrated and returned to service.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further action required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications as a result of this event.