


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400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 16, 1981

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATORS
ON AIR CLEANUP UNITS - NCR 1237 - REVISED FINAL REPORT

The subject nonconformance was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. W. Wright on August 1, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Interim reports were submitted August 29 and November 10, 1980, and our final report was submitted April 9, 1981. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this deficiency. As discussed with R. V. Crlenjak by telephone on July 14, 1981, enclosed is our revised final report. The reason for the revision is to change the expected completion date of the corrective action. The date for completion has been delayed because of the extent of the rework required.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATORS
ON AIR CLEANUP UNITS
NCR 1237 - 10CFR50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

The differential pressure indicators, on the majority of the air cleanup units provided by CTI-Nuclear, are improperly tubed.

Safety Implications

The differential pressure indicators are required to notify plant personnel of the need to change the filters to prevent clogging. Because these specific air cleanup units operate continuously at Bellefonte and are also required postaccident, the filters must not be allowed to become clogged. Should they become clogged, low airflow would result and the required negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building could not be maintained. Thus, had this item gone undetected, it could have adversely affected safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

CTI-Nuclear representatives met with TVA representatives at the Bellefonte site and agreed that a majority of the differential pressure indicators were improperly connected to the sampling lines. Agreement was reached that the best solution to the concern would be to remove the indicator panel and retube the connection lines on the back of the panels. TVA is to proceed with the recommended solution. TVA expects to complete the work by August 21, 1981. CTI-Nuclear has certified that if TVA retubes the back of the indicator panel with the same type and quality of tubing and fittings used originally, that the equipment meets the seismic qualification requirements of the contract and that CTI-Nuclear's original warranty is still valid.

As all material and equipment on this contract has been delivered to the jobsite, no action to prevent recurrence at Bellefonte has been initiated. TVA is continually reviewing CTI-Nuclear's quality program.

The only other TVA site to verify similar conditions for the CTI-Nuclear air cleanup units was Watts Bar. However, the pressure indicators are only for local indication and are not safety related.