LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | T N S N P 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 (7) | 0 6 2 3 8 1 (8) | 0 7 0 7 8 1 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | With Unit 1 in Mode 4 with RCS temperature at 320°F and pressure at 700 psig, it was

0 3 | discovered that a pipe hanger had been omitted from a 3/4" test and fill line from the

0 4 | 3" boron injection line to the safety injection accumulators. This event is reportable

0 5 | under 6.9.1.12.i of Sequoyah Unit 1 Technical Specifications. There was no effect upon

0 6 | public health or safety. Previous occurrences - NONE

0 7 |

0 8 |

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: S F (11) | CAUSE CODE: B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: S U P O R T (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: A (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 1 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 6 9 | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 | REPORT TYPE T | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: L (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: X 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The required hanger was installed on 6-24-81. The hanger was installed prior to

1 1 | entry into Mode 1 so that the Unit would not have to be shut down in the event the

1 2 | safety analysis indicated a pipe failure would occur.

1 3 |

1 4 |

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: G (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Piping Inspection

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA

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NRC USE ONLY

Name of Preparer: Glenn B. Kirk/M. R. Harding Phone: (615) 842-8317

[redacted] Valley Authority
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/81069 Technical Specification Involved: 6.9.1.12.i

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.12.i

Date of Occurrence: 6-23-81 Time Of Occurrence: 0800 CST

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

During a Unit 2 inspection, it was discovered that proper support was not provided at 2-FCV-63-174 on a 3/4" test and fill line from the 3" boron injection line to the safety injection accumulators. An inspection of Unit 1 piping in this same area resulted in a similar finding.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in Mode 4 with RCS temperature 320°F and pressure at 700 psig.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

TVA Engineering Design failed to provide proper support requirements on original design drawings.

Analysis of Occurrence:

A safety analysis completed on 7-2-81 indicated that during a seismic event the absence of the hanger could result in rupture of the 3/4" test and fill line. This would result in loss of the ECCS boron injection line and possible loss of containment integrity.

Corrective Action:

The required hanger was installed on 6-24-81. The hanger was installed prior to entry into Mode 1 so that the Unit would not have to be shut down in the event the safety analysis indicated a pipe failure would occur.

Failure Data: NONE