OFFICIAL COPY

81-004-03L ✓

May 18, 1981
L-81-208

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

RE: RII:JPO
50-389
Attachments Welded To Containment Vessel

As previously reported to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement on April 16, 1981, we have identified unauthorized field welded attachments on the containment vessel shell at two locations. Pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) requirements, a final report is attached.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/TCG/ah
Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555 (w/att.)

Harold F. Reis, Esquire

IE27
S1/1

FINAL DEFICIENCY REPORT

Attachments Welded to Containment Vessel

Name of Station:	St. Lucie Plant - Unit 2
Owner:	Florida Power & Light Company
Architect/Engineer:	Ebasco Services, Incorporated
NRC Notification:	April 16, 1981
Final Report Filed:	May 18, 1981

I. Summary

During a general inspection of the containment vessel, unauthorized field welded attachments, which do not meet applicable ASME Code requirements, were identified at two locations on the vessel.

Per the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e), the event was deemed potentially reportable and per telecon, FPL notified the NRC on April 16, 1981 of such. Upon further evaluation of the matter, we deem the event reportable and this final report is being submitted to advise the NRC of the description of the deficiency and the corrective actions that have been taken.

II. Description

During a general inspection of the containment vessel, unauthorized welding was discovered on the vessel shell at two locations. The first unauthorized weld is at Azimuth 189° and Elevation 147' -5" on the inside surface of the vessel. The weld is a 3/8 inch diameter burr which indicated something had been attached and removed, leaving only the burr. The second unauthorized weld is at Azimuth 187° and Elevation 145' -0" on the inside surface of the vessel. The weld is a 3/6 inch (approximately) fillet weld 2 inches long attaching a clip. There is no evidence that preheat was used for either weld.

The St. Lucie Unit 2 containment vessel is designed per the requirements of ASME Code, Section III, 1971 Edition through Summer 1972 Addenda. Part NE paragraph NE-4430 of the Summer 1972 Addenda details the requirements of the welding of attachments. The two unauthorized welds in question constituted a Code violation of four subparagraphs of paragraph NE-4430. The four subparagraphs violated are NE-4431, NE-4432, NE-4435 and NE-4436.

III. Corrective Action

A nonconformance report (NCR#1704M) has been issued which identifies the deficiency. Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) has issued a Special Repair Procedure SR-9 to correct/remove the identified weld deficiencies. Corrective action has been taken in accordance with the procedure.

IV. Safety Implication

The identified weld deficiencies found during a general inspection, if remained undiscovered during the plant's 40 year life, could have had a potential effect on the structural integrity of the containment vessel shell.

V. Conclusion

The two weld deficiencies on the containment vessel shell have been corrected utilizing CB&I's Special Repair Procedure SR-9.