



Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000

July 20, 1981

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director of USNRC
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-62/03L



Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-62/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,


R. A. Uderitz
General Manager -
Nuclear Production

CC: Director, Office of Inspection
and Enforcement (30 copies)
Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
(3 copies)

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The Energy People

Report Number: 81-62/03L

Report Date: July 20, 1981

Occurrence Date: 6-21-81

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Residual Heat Removal System Valving Misalignments.
This report was initiated by Incident Reports 81-200 and 81-201.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Modes 4 and 3 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 Mwe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1981, No. 11 residual heat removal (RHR) pump, No. 11 RHR heat exchanger, and the No. 11 and No. 12 RHR heat exchanger bypass valve 1RH20 were cleared and tagged for internal component inspection. After the inspection was completed, the previously mentioned components were released by the Maintenance Department to the operating shift. The release of the blocking tags and the improper restoration of the RHR System components, led to the inadvertent draining of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to less than the technical specifications limit of 350,000 gallons and an inoperable emergency core cooling subsystem.

At 0948 hours, June 21, 1981, control room personnel noticed that the RWST level had decreased to less than the minimum requirement of 350,000 gallons required by the technical specifications and action statement 3.1.2.8.b was entered. The refilling of the RWST and an investigation to determine the reason for the decreasing level were initiated immediately. The investigation revealed that two vent valves in the RHR System, 1RH72 and 1RH73, had been left in the open position during system restoration. The vent valves, 1RH72 and 1RH73 were closed, and at 1035 hours the RWST level was restored to greater than 350,000 gallons and action statement 3.1.2.8.b was terminated.

The results of the surveillance test performed on No. 11 RHR pump, when it was returned to service, were reviewed and found to be unsatisfactory. At 1200 hours, June 21, 1981, during the valve alignment verification made in preparation for the surveillance retest of No. 11 RHR pump, the No. 11 RHR heat exchanger inlet isolation valve 11RH14 was discovered to be in the locked closed position, instead of the required position of locked open. Valve 11RH14 was immediately repositioned to the open position and locked. The surveillance retest of No. 11 RHR pump was completed satisfactorily at 1216 hours. The misalignment of valve 11RH14 led to entry into

July 20, 1981

operational mode 3 during unit heatup with an inoperable emergency core cooling subsystem. The inoperable emergency core cooling system was restored to an operable condition when 11RH14 was repositioned at 1200 hours, June 21, 1981.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with technical specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Personnel error. When the RHR System tags were released and the system was realigned, vent valves 1RH72 and 1RH73 were not closed and valve 11RH14 was left in the locked closed position. Double verification of the system realignment was also not completed as required by departmental procedures.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURANCES:

Technical specification 3.1.2.8.b requires that with the refueling water storage tank inoperable, either restore the tank to an operable status within one hour or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Technical specification 3.5.2 requires that with one emergency core cooling subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


Operations personnel directly involved were counseled on the errors they made in the clearing of the tags and the realignment of the RHR System. A letter, dated June 29, 1981, was issued to all operating personnel, informing them of the occurrences and the errors made. The letter also stressed the importance of fulfilling the responsibilities of their jobs.

FAILURE DATA:

No Applicable

Prepared By J. J. Espey

SORC Meeting No. 81-63


Manager - Salem Generating Station