


LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK. 

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

0 2 On June 24, 1981, while performing QIS-39, Loss of Electrohydraulic Fluid Pressure

0 3 Calibration and Functional Test, pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 tripped at 887 psig.

0 4 The Technical Specification Table 3.1-3 limit is greater than or equal to 900 psig.

0 5 The other three pressure switches in the one out of two twice logic did trip at the

0 6 correct pressure therefore, the consequences of this occurrence are minimal.

0 7 The Reactor Protection System would have worked as designed.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----|----|-----------------------|----|-----------------|----|-----------------|---|--------------|---|----------------------|---|------------------|---|----------------------|---|------------------------|---|---|---|---|----|--|
| 0 | 8 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | | | | | | | |
| SYSTEM CODE | | | CAUSE CODE | | CAUSE SUBCODE | | COMPONENT CODE | | | | | | COMP. SUBCODE | | VALVE SUBCODE | | | | | | | | |
| I | A | 11 | E | 12 | E | 13 | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | S | 15 | Z | 16 | | | | | | |
| EVENT YEAR | | | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | | OCCURRENCE CODE | | REPORT TYPE | | REVISION NO. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 18 | 1 | 21 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 28 | L | 30 | 0 | 32 | | | | | | | | | | |
| ACTION TAKEN | | | FUTURE ACTION | | EFFECT ON PLANT | | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | HOURS | | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | | | | | | |
| E | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | N | 25 | B | 0 | 6 | 9 | 26 | |
| CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

| | |
|----|--|
| 10 | The cause of this occurrence was instrument drift. The switch was recalibrated |
| 11 | and functionally tested to verify the setpoint. The I-5600-PS-3 has drifted |
| 12 | previously but recent testing show no signs of adverse trends. No further |
| 13 | corrective action is required. |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---------------------|----|----|--------------------|----|----|---------------------|----|--------------|-----------------------|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | 80 | | | |
| FACILITY STATUS | | | % POWER | | | OTHER STATUS | | | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 5 | E | 28 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 29 | NA | B | 31 | Routine Test | | | 80 | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 80 | | |
| ACTIVITY CONTENT | | | RELEASED OF RELEASE | | | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | | | LOCATION OF RELEASE | | | | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | | | NA | | | | | | 80 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 80 | | |
| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | | | NUMBER | | | TYPE | | | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 80 | | |
| PERSONNEL INJURIES | | | NUMBER | | | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 80 | | |
| LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | | | TYPE | | | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | 80 | |
| 1 | 9 | Z | 42 | NA | | | | | | | | | | | | 80 |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 80 | | |

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NRC USE ONLY

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PDR 4DOCK 05000254
S PDR

J. Guest

PHONE: 309-654-2241, ext. 173

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 81-12/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit One
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On June 24, 1981, at 2000 while performing routine surveillance test QIS-39, Loss of Electrohydraulic Fluid Pressure Calibration and Functional Test, pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 tripped at 887 psig, which is 13 psi below the Technical Specification limit of greater than or equal to 900 psig. The three other pressure switches on the Unit were found to trip above 900 psig. The pressure switch was immediately recalibrated and tested satisfactorily.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The four pressure switches are arranged in a one out of two twice logic design. The three other switches were all within the Technical Specification limits. Therefore, an EHC low fluid pressure condition would have been detected above the Technical Specification limit, and a reactor scram would have been initiated. The safety of the plant was not affected by this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of the occurrence was instrument setpoint drift. The pressure switch is a model C9612-2, manufactured by Barksdale Company.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to recalibrate the pressure switch to trip above the required setpoint. A functional test was then successfully performed. This switch had previously drifted below the required setpoint during April 1980, but had performed acceptably subsequent to that event until this failure. No definite adverse trend has been exhibited, hence no further corrective action is planned at this time.