




## Nebraska Public Power District

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION  
P.O. BOX 98, BROWNVILLE, NEBRASKA 68321  
TELEPHONE (402) 825-3811

CNSS810335

June 16, 1981

Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive  
Suite 1090  
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.3 of the Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on May 22, 1981. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

Report No.: 50-298-81-11  
Report Date: June 16, 1981  
Occurrence Date: May 22, 1981  
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station  
Brownville, Nebraska 68321

**Identification of Occurrence:**

Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative controls.

**Conditions Prior to Occurrence:**

At the time of the discovery of this occurrence, the reactor was in cold shutdown for refueling.

**Description of Occurrence:**

The Core Spray header break detection instruments were found to be cross connected.

**Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:**

This occurrence was caused by the instrument piping inside the drywell being cross connected at the drywell penetration during plant construction.

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Mr. K. V. Seyfrit  
June 16, 1981  
Page 2.

Analysis of Occurrence:

While using air pressure to void a Core Spray vessel penetration for radiography, a Core Spray break detection alarm was received on the opposite loop. A follow-up investigation of this unexpected alarm revealed that the Core Spray header break detection instruments were in fact connected to the incorrect loops. A review of the station records indicated that the valves and piping outside the drywell from the instruments up to and including the drywell penetration were as designed. The error was that the instrument lines inside the drywell from the Core Spray headers were attached to the incorrect pipe at the drywell penetration during plant construction.


The function of this detection system is to detect a break in the Core Spray piping between the vessel penetration and the core shroud penetration. If a Core Spray pipe were to break in this area, the Core Spray loop would still inject water into the reactor vessel outside the shroud and provide for core flooding if the lower reactor vessel was intact. In the event an ECCS injection was needed, both loops of the Core Spray System would have started automatically and injected water in the reactor vessel.

This occurrence had no adverse affect on the public health and safety. The event is not repetitive.

Corrective Action:

The Core Spray break detection instruments were connected to the proper header.

Sincerely,



L. C. Lessor  
Station Superintendent  
Cooper Nuclear Station

LCL:cg  
Attach.