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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

May 11, 1981

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-. . This report concerns the primary containment internal pressure reaching .30 psig. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO/djs

cc: Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
Post Office Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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S1/1

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

INCIDENT REPORT

REPORT NUMBER: 81-50

REPORT DATE: April 29, 1981

OCCURRENCE DATE: April 11, 1981; 0220 hours

FACILITY: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Cornelius, N.C.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Primary containment internal pressure reached .305 psig.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Mode 3, Hot Standby, prior to initial criticality.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: While waiting for proper documentation to make a gaseous release through the Containment Air Addition & Release System (VQ), containment pressure exceeded the limits specified by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 by .005 psig. This constituted a degraded mode of operation.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: An insufficient amount of lead time was given to perform the necessary sampling and analysis.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The Reactor Coolant System (NC) had been increasing in temperature and pressure for some time during this and the previous mode of operation. Consequently, the containment ambient temperature and internal pressure were increasing at a corresponding rate. To maintain containment internal pressure within specified limits, gaseous waste releases (GWR's) were frequently made through the VQ system.

At the time of this event, the normally scheduled Shift Supervisor was absent from work; his position was filled by one of the plant's Operating Engineers. This individual was not made aware of the amount of lead time necessary to complete the paperwork involved with GWR's.

At 0030 hours sampling for a GWR of containment was initiated. The sample was drawn from 0105 until 0155 hours. Then it was counted and analyzed. The results were reported to the Control Room at 0220 hours. (Total elapsed time was 90 minutes.) The release was commenced at 0234 hours to decrease containment pressure; it was restored to .3 psi. at 0241 hours. The GWR was secured at 0530 hours following a total release of 11,690 ft^3.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: A controlled gaseous waste release to reduce containment pressure was initiated prior to surpassing Technical Specification limits.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The $\pm$.3 psig limit imposed by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 is to ensure that containment vessel pressure is maintained within a safe margin so that the designed peak pressure load (15 psig) would not be exceeded in the event of a simultaneous design base accident. There is currently no thermal load to the system as a result of decay heat or neutron activity because only new, non-irradiated fuel exists in the core. Additionally, no major accident occurred in containment during the plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.