DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

June 11, 1981

81-092-03L

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-86. This report concerns both trains of the control room ventilation system inoperable while in Mode 4. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-86

Report Date: June 8, 1981

Occurrence Date: May 28, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: Both trains of the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System were inoperable while in Mode 4.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Mode 4, Hot Shutdown; prior to initial criticality.

Description of Occurrence: On May 27, 1981, the VC train B Control Room Area (CRA) HEPA filters and Pre-filters were replaced. However, a HEPA filter retest on train B was omitted. This retest was required to make train B operable. Therefore, when the plant entered Mode 4 on May 28, only VC train A was operable. The Shift Supervisor, however, thought that both trains were operable. He therefore tagged out (AHU breaker disconnected) train A for maintenance leaving no trains of the VC System operable while in Mode 4. This was reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 3.7.6 and 6.9.1.12(b).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: VC train B was not listed as a Technical Specification item in the Operations Technical Specification log book and no HEPA filter retest was performed on VC train B prior to the plant entering Mode 4. After entering Mode 4, VC train A was tagged out for maintenance with train B inoperable (because of outstanding retest requirement).

Safety Analysis: Even though VC train B HEPA filters had not been retested and train B was technically inoperable when the plant entered Mode 4, it was inadvertently returned to service. However, no problems occurred and safe plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected. Also, both trains tested satisfactorily after the incident was discovered.

Corrective Action: The plant began cooling down to Mode 5 at 1002 hours on May 29. VC trains A and B HEPA filters were retested and declared operable. Shift Supervisors were cautioned about expanding work requests without proper reviews.