

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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81-090-03L

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

June 9, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-84. This report concerns damage of several safety related containment isolation valves. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker Jr by WAH
William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

Ms. M. J. Graham
Resident Inspector - NRC
McGuire Nuclear Station

IE22
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Incident Identification No: 81-84

Report Date: June 9, 1981

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1

Identification of Deficiency: Safety Related Containment Isolation Valves
1NI264, 1NI266, 1NI267 Type C leakage deficiency.

Identification of Deficiency: During the secondary UHI accumulator check valve testing on valves 1NI248 and 1NI249, to verify Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary integrity, the containment isolation valves 1NI264, 1NI266 and 1NI267 were used as system isolation valves and experienced reverse pressurization of approximately 2485 PSIG. This reverse pressurization resulted in an equivalent seating torque in excess of design requirements for the containment isolation function for valves 1NI264, 1NI266 and 1NI267. As a result, the soft seats were damaged to a point such that subsequent Type C testing results exceeded containment isolation leakage criteria.

Analysis of Safety Implications: Had this deficiency not been identified, containment isolation leakage could have exceeded 10CFR50, Appendix J requirements under certain postulated accident conditions.

Corrective Action: This problem will be resolved by replacing the damaged soft seat disc assembly with a new type soft seat disc assembly designed for these conditions. This action is scheduled to be completed by June 22, 1981.