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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28202

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 6, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

81-048-031


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-41. This report concerns a firestop being found open. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalley
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
Post Office Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303



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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-41

Report Date: April 27, 1981

Occurrence Date: April 8, 1981

Facility: McGuire, Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: A firestop was found open. No firewatch had been established.

Condition Prior to Occurrence: Mode 4, Hot Shutdown

Description of Occurrence: A penetration was discovered open in the floor of the Health Physics change room, El. 767. The hole had not been sealed and no firewatch had been posted. This constituted a degraded mode of operation pursuant to Technical Specification 3.7.11.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: When Construction sealed all the holes, penetrations, etc., in fire barriers throughout the plant, this particular hole was overlooked. It was obscured by a large trunk. When the trunk was moved, the hole was discovered.

Analysis of Occurrence: If a fire had started, the lack of a firestop would have made it somewhat more difficult to control the fire. However, it would not have interfered with the Operators' ability to maintain the plant in a safe mode.

Corrective Action: A firewatch was established upon discovery of the open penetration. A shutdown request was written to repair the firestop.

Safety Analysis: A fire in this area would not have destroyed any set of redundant equipment, cable, instrumentation, etc., necessary for safe plant shutdown. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.