

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION


June 19, 1981

TELEPHONE AREA 704  
373-4083

81-005-034-

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-270



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/81-1, Revision 1. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Investigation of the incident, "Nonexistent Flow of LPSW to 2A HPI Pump Motor Bearing Coolers," has been completed. The additional information resulting from this investigation is included in the attached. The original report was submitted to your office by my letter of February 19, 1981.

Very truly yours,

*William O. Parker, Jr.*  
William C. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:scs  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management & Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
P. O. Box 10412  
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/81-1, Revision 1

Report Date: June 19, 1981

Occurrence Date: January 20, 1981

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Non-Existent Flow of LPSW to "2A" HPI Pump  
Motor Bearing Coolers

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence:

At approximately 0230 on January 20, 1981, it was discovered that there was no flow of Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) to the "2A" High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump. This lack of flow was found during the pre-start check for the "2A" HPI pump. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.3.1.c.2(b) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The reason for the loss of flow appears to be "crud" buildup within the carbon steel line.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The line in which LPSW flow was stopped is the discharge from HPI pump "A" motor bearing cooling jacket. Flow must be maintained in order to keep a safe operating temperature for the HPI pump motor bearings. In case of failure of the temperature controller valve in this line there is a bypass line to maintain flow. The bypass was used, and the use of "2A" HPI pump was not lost.

At the time it was found that there was no flow in the "2A" bearing cooler, pumps "2B" and "2C" were available for use. Therefore, the HPI system was not impaired. Also the use of "2A" was quickly regained when flow was restored. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

When lack of flow was encountered, valve 2/TCV/p was bypassed, and flow was restored. A modification to replace portions of the carbon steel piping with stainless steel will be implemented.