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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 13, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RS-270/81-06, Revision 1. The original report, submitted to your office on May 8, 1981, in some cases incorrectly identified Valve 2PR-7 as Valve 2PR-F. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

JLJ/djs
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE UNIT 2

REPORT NUMBER: RO-270/81-06, Revision 1

REPORT DATE: May 13, 1981

OCCURRENCE DATE: April 9, 1981

FACILITY: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of Valve 2PR-8 to Open During ES On-Line Testing.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: 100% FP

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: At 0930 on April 9, 1981, valve 2PR-8 failed to open during on-line ES testing. Valve 2PR-7 was locked closed until valve 2PR-8 was repaired and tested operable at 1858 on April 9, 1981. The closing of valves 2PR-7 and 2PR-8 isolated radiation Monitors 2 RIA-47, -48, and -49. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.1.6.8 and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b.(2).

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: Valve 2PR-8 failed to open due to a faulty valve operator diaphragm.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: Technical Specification 3.1.6.8. requires that two means of different operating principles shall be operable for detecting reactor coolant leakage when the reactor is critical and above 2% power with one of the systems sensitive to radioactivity. The system sensitive to radioactivity may be out of service for 48 hours if there are two other means to detect leakage operable.

While RIA's 47, 48, and 49 were out of service, the above requirement was met by operability of the normal RB sump level indicator and the means described in Technical Specification 3.1.6 Bases Section d. Since 2PR-8 failed closed and 2PR-7 was locked closed, the R.B. isolation was not degraded by this incident. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Valve 2PR-7 was locked closed until valve 2PR-8 was declared operable. Valve 2PR-8 was repaired and verified operable at 1858 on April 9, 1981.