

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 5, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

81-047-03L

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-369



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-369/81-40. This report concerns Channel I of Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate for Steam Generator 'A' and Channel III for Steam Generator 'D' being declared inoperable. This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

RWO: [Signature]
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalley
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, CA 94303

IE22
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

INCIDENT REPORT

Report Number: 81-40

Report Date: April 14, 1981

Occurrence Date: April 5, 1981

Facility: McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence: Channel I of Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate for Steam Generator 'A' and Channel III on Steam Generator 'D' declared inoperable.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Mode 4, Hot Shutdown.

Description of Occurrence: On April 5, 1981 at 0950 hours, the Shift Supervisor discovered that the pressure gauges for S/G 'A' Steam Line Pressure Channel I and S/G 'D' Steam Line Pressure Channel III were indicating some pressure with no pressure in the steam lines. Both channels were declared inoperable. This incident was therefore reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.2.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The two pressure gauges were not indicating properly because their respective transmitters (VERITRAC 59PMI) were bad. One transmitter was out of linearity and could not be calibrated and the bellows of the other transmitter was ruptured.

Analysis of Occurrence: Before going to Mode 4 on April 4, 1981, personnel were performing a periodic test on S/G 'A' Steam Line Pressure Channel I and S/G 'D' Steam Line Pressure Channel III as required by the PM/PT Program. During this time, they discovered that the transmitters were bad but they could not be replaced since there were no spare transmitters in stock. The Supervisor in charge had previously initiated a purchase requisition to transfer all similar transmitters from Unit 2 to Unit 1 to be used as spares. However, as a Shutdown Request requirement, the Unit 2 transmitters could not be removed and transferred to Unit 1 until their replacements were available. After going to Mode 4, the Supervisor was able to finally obtain the two transmitters from Unit 2 and the bad Unit 1 transmitters were replaced on April 9, 1981.

Safety Analysis: While the plant was at Mode 4, the Residual Heat Removal System (ND) continued to serve as the heat sink. Since the steam generators were not used, the significance of the S/G Steam Line Pressure Instrumentation being inoperable had no effect on the plant's safe operation. Moreover, the health and safety of the public were not affected. If the S/G's had been operating, 2 out of 3 channels would be required in any steam line for main steam line isolation to occur.

Corrective Action: The Shift Supervisor requested personnel to place the affected channels in the trip position immediately upon declaring them inoperable. (This is done by placing the loop in the TEST position.) The transmitters were replaced, tested, and calibrated and both channels were declared operable on April 9, 1981 at 1145 hours.