

CONTROL BLOCK:

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|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | | | 1 |
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|
| 0 | 1 | W | I | P | B | H | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | 5 |
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7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

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| 0 | 1 |
| 7 | 8 |

REPORT SOURCE

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|------------|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|---|---|-------------|---|---|---|----|
| L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 9 |
| 60 | 61 | | | | | | | | 68 | 69 | | | | | | 74 | 75 | | | | | | | 80 |
| DOCKET NUMBER | | | | | | | | | | EVENT DATE | | | | | | | | | | REPORT DATE | | | | |

0 2 | At 1316 hours on 06-26-81 Unit 1 tripped from approximately 80% power
0 3 | due to the loss of power to the red instrument bus. The trip was
0 4 | induced due to the effect of the power loss on both protective and
0 5 | control systems. An additional result of the loss of power was the loss
0 6 | of LPT-945, Unit 1 containment pressure. The loss of this channel for
0 7 | less than one minute reduced the degree of redundancy to zero and is
0 8 | reportable in accordance with T. S. 15.6.9.2.A.2.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|-------------|----|----|----|-----------------------|------------|----|----|----|---------------|-----------------|----|----|----------------|----|-------------|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|----|--------------|---------------|----|----|----|---------------|----|----|----|----|-----------------|----|----|----|----|-----------------|----|----|--|----|-------|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|----|----------------------|--|---|--|----|------------------|--|---|--|----|----------------------|--|---|--|----|------------------------|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|----|
| 09 | | SYSTEM CODE | | E | B | 11 | CAUSE CODE | | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | | F | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | | | | C | K | T | B | R | K | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | | A | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | | Z | 16 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | | EVENT YEAR | | 8 | 1 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | | 6 | | 0 | 7 | OCCURRENCE CODE | | 0 | | 1 | REPORT TYPE | | T | | REVISION NO. | | 0 | | ACTION TAKEN | | H | | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | | H | | 19 | EFFECT OF PLANT | | A | | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | | C | | 21 | HOURS | | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | | Y | | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | | N | | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | | N | | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | | | | W | 1 | 2 | 0 | 26 |

1 0 The cause of the lost bus was attributed to a contractor employee per-
1 1 forming backfitting modifications required to meet new regulatory
1 2 requirements. The contractor was working in the immediate area and
1 3 accidentally interrupted the bus power supply. The bus was immediately
1 4 transferred to its alternate supply and the recovery from the trip was
7 8 9 normal. #

| FACILITY STATUS | | | | % POWER | | | | OTHER STATUS | | | | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | | | | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|----|---------|----|----|----|--------------|--|--|--|---------------------|----|----------------------|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|
| 1 | 5 | E | 28 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 29 | N/A | | | | A | 31 | Operator observation | | | | | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | | | | | 45 | 46 | | | | | | |

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A

| PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|------|------------------|----|---|----|-----|--|--|
| NUMBER | | | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (39) | | | | | | |
| 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | | |

| PERSONNEL INJURIES | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| NUMBER | DESCRIPTION (41) |
| 000 (40) | N/A |

| 7 | | 8 | | 9 | | 10 | | 11 | | 12 | | |
|------------------------------------|---|-------------|------|-----|--|----|--|----|--|----|--|--|
| LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TYPE | | DESCRIPTION | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 9 | Z | (42) | N/A | | | | | | | | |

7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

(2) (0) (N) (44) N/A

8107200080 810710
PDR ADOCK 05000266
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

6.8 6.9 8.0

NAME OF PREPARER C. W. Fay

PHONE: 414/277-2811

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 81-007/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Docket No. 50-266

During normal operation, at 1316 hours on June 26, 1981, Unit 1 tripped from approximately 80% power due to the loss of the red instrument bus. The trip was induced due to the effect of the lost instrument bus on both protective and control systems. An additional result of the lost bus was the loss of 1PT-945, Unit 1 containment pressure. The loss of this channel for less than one minute reduced the degree of redundancy required by Technical Specification 15.3.5-3 to zero. Both sets of containment spray logic were operable at all times; one with 3 of 3, one with 2 of 3 channels available. This event of lost redundancy is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.2.

The cause of the loss of power to the bus was attributed to a contractor employee performing backfitting modifications required to meet new regulatory requirements. The contractor was working in the immediate area and accidentally opened the disconnect switch on the red bus inverter and interrupted the instrument bus power supply. The bus was immediately transferred to its alternate supply by control room operators.

The momentary power loss to the red bus caused a steam generator feed regulator valve to shut and a trip on feed flow/steam flow mismatch in coincidence with low steam generator level. All systems functioned normal after the trip and the unit was placed back on line approximately three hours later at 1615 hours.

Plant contractors have been reinstructed to use extreme caution while working in sensitive and safety-related areas in the plant. Point Beach employee surveillance of contractors will be increased to help prevent occurrences of this type in the future.